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Despite theories of private interests as the cause of the Iraq War dominating the 
public discourse about the war, the academic debate over the true cause of this puzzling 
war neglects to seriously consider these folk theories. This thesis attempts to answer the 
question of what truth lays behind the common theories that the Bush Administration 
pushed to invade Iraq to benefit Big Oil, the arms industry, Halliburton, or because of 
neoliberal ideology. To accomplish this task, this research presents, critiques, and 
evaluates the best evidence available for each of these widely believed folk theories of 
private interests as the cause of the Iraq War. 
While the arms industry theory and the neoliberalism theory add some 
interesting details to the story of the Iraq War, they make less than compelling cases 
that those parochial interests were significant causes of the war. Relatively strong 
evidence shows Big Oil and the Cheney-Halliburton connection to almost certainly 
have played significant role in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq. By 
studying these folk theories of private interests as the cause of the Iraq War, private 
interests can be shown to have been a significant factor in the decision to invade Iraq 
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Introduction: Why Invade Iraq? 
On February 15th of 2003, millions gathered around the world to protest the 
imminent invasion of Iraq by the United States and the Coalition of the Willing. These 
protesters carried signs proclaiming, “No Blood for Oil!” and other ant-war slogans.1 
Earlier that year, Member of Parliament and future Labor Party leader Jeremy Corbyn 
would declare unequivocally that “it’s a war about oil and it’s a war where the main 
beneficiaries will be the arms manufacturers.”2 In 2009, future US Senator Rand Paul 
while speaking before college students claimed that Vice President Cheney pushed to 
invade Iraq to personally profit and to profit his former company, Halliburton.3 As the 
Bush administration’s justifications for the war fell apart following the invasion, the 
public, politicians, and scholars alike presented their theories to explain the true causes 
of the Iraq War. In the public sphere, many believe that private interests played a 
significant or even decisive role in the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq. 
These beliefs constitute folk theories that manifest in the form of signs and chants at 
protests loudly asserting ‘No Blood for Oil’ and in the form of speeches railing against 
the military industrial complex. These folk theories which typically claim the US fought 
the Iraq War for the profits of some private interest captured the public’s imagination 
and perception of the Iraq War, but they are rarely examined in an academic context. 
                                                        
1 “5 Photographs From The Day The World Said No To War,” Imperial War Museums, accessed May 6, 
2021, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/5-photographs-from-the-day-the-world-said-no-to-war. 
2 Jeremy Corbyn — No War in Iraq! — 18 Jan 2003, 2003, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANNhzJlHJFc. 
3 David Corn, “Watch: Rand Paul Claims Dick Cheney Pushed to Invade Iraq so Halliburton Would 





This thesis continues the work of answering the question of why did the United 
States invade Iraq? And more specifically, what role did private interests play in that 
fateful decision to go to war? The study of folk theories helps answer these crucial 
question by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of popular but underexamined 
theories. These popular theories make connections between Iraq’s vast oil reserves and 
influential oil companies or the seemingly unnecessary war and the powerful military 
industrial complex or the fortune made by military contractors like Halliburton during 
the Iraq War and its former CEO, Vice President Cheney. This thesis investigates what 
truth can be found in these folk theories. Through this task of examining and reviewing 
the evidence available that supports common theories that private interests were a 
significant cause of the Iraq War, this thesis aspires to reveal what role private interests 
played the decision to invade Iraq. While the war cannot definitively be said to have 
been the results of private interests, significant evidence connects the Bush 
Administration’s push for war with the oil industry and the reconstruction contractor 
Halliburton via Vice President Cheney. While the other theories investigated in this 
thesis reveal some interesting details about private interests and US foreign policy, 
these two private interests most likely played some role in the Bush Administration’s 
push for war.  
Falling from its initial level of 72% support among US citizens according to a 
Gallup poll from March of 2003, the Iraq War has widely been regarded a disastrous 
mistake.4  The lost lives, non-existent WMDs, the failure at nation building, prolonged 
                                                        






insurgency, alienated allies, and wasted tax dollars have made the Iraq War a clear 
mistake in the eyes of the public. Along with countless Democrats, even Republican 
President Donald Trump would claim the war was “a tremendous mistake” and falsely 
assert that he had always been against the war.5  Despite the widespread condemnation 
of the Iraq War, there has not been an honest reckoning with the conditions that led to 
the Iraq War and policies implemented to avoid a similar event in the future. The 
Obama Administration generally held “a belief that we need to look forward as opposed 
to looking backwards” in relation to the Bush Administration’s policy.6 If private 
interests caused the Iraq War as these folk theories allege, nothing has been changed to 
prevent private interests from hijacking the state for their own ends again in the future. 
Corporate interests still influence government through embedding policy makers via the 
revolving door or by simply lobbying politicians. This research will ideally make 
progress toward identifying the conditions with domestic politics which lead to 
overextensions like the Iraq War and help prevent similar events from happening in the 
future. The popular theories examined in this thesis will be the Big Oil theory, the arms 
lobby theory, the Cheney-Halliburton theory, and the neoliberal, privatization theory. 
The Gap between the Public Conversation and Academic Discourse 
This project of cataloging and evaluating different folk theories of the origins of 
the Iraq War arises from the gap between the popular discourse surrounding the Iraq 
War and the academic discourse. A fair amount of distance should be expected between 
                                                        
5 Hope Yen, “AP FACT CHECK: Trump Spins Tales on Bin Laden, Iraq War,” AP NEWS, sec. Osama 
bin Laden, accessed May 6, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/osama-bin-laden-donald-trump-ap-top-
news-politics-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-5541490f4ad945be8e9c0b46520da943. 
6 David Johnston and Charlie Savage, “Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs,” The New York 




the public understanding of the Iraq War and the naturally more nuanced understanding 
in academia, but the commonality of belief in these folk theories in the public sphere 
makes the near silence on these theories in academia particularly interesting. For the 
most part, when academics discuss these theories, they either quickly dismiss them or 
the academic will dance around directly proposing a theory of private interests by 
clearly showing evidence that supports a theory of private interests while never making 
the type of absolutist statement about the veracity of a theory that the public commonly 
makes. Despite the silence in the formal literature, many academics “quietly propose 
that private US corporate interests in oil-related or war-related profits were the likely 
primary motives behind the war.”7 The idea that private interests played a crucial role in 
the decision to invade Iraq has salience in the public’s imagination and in the minds of 
some academics. However, the “fear of damaging their professional reputations and 
being labeled conspiracy theorists” likely causes academics to hesitate before diving 
into investigating these theories of private interests.8 
Conspiracy Theory and Private Interests 
Politicians often term theories of private interests as ‘conspiracy theories’ to 
make them seem like illogical and esoteric beliefs. Generally, “conspiracy theories are 
understood to be delusional beliefs produced by irrational individuals on the political 
fringe” and are not worthy of academic or any sort of serious consideration.9 The label 
of conspiracy theory effectively serves to silence and easily dismiss many hypotheses, 
                                                        
7 Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Florence, UNITED 
STATES: Routledge, 2011), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uoregon/detail.action?docID=957709. 
8 Cramer and Thrall. 
9 Tim Aistrope, Conspiracy Theory and American Foreign Policy, New Approaches to Conflict Analysis 




legitimate or illegitimate, which challenge the foreign policy decisions of those in 
power. Tony Blair, when asked about the cause of the Iraq War in the House of 
Commons in 2003, dismissed “the conspiracy theory that this is somehow to do with 
oil.”10 A conspiracy theory can be defined as “a belief that an event or situation is the 
result of a secret plan made by powerful people.”11 This standard definition does not 
differentiate between entirely unreasonable claims like the earth being flat for example 
and the real conspiracies that have existed. The terminology of conspiracy theory 
presents a significant challenge as the obviously illegitimate and absurd theories can be 
lumped together with historically demonstrable conspiracies. The September 11th 
Attacks capture both sides of conspiracy theories. While not always discussed in these 
terms, the terrorist plan did constitute a conspiracy, but unsubstantiated theories of it 
being a result of a government conspiracy are frequently circulated.12 The Iran-Contra 
Affair and Watergate stand out as just two among “the many historical examples of 
actual conspiracies that seemed unlikely” at the time but have, over time, been revealed 
to be true.13 The lumping together of legitimate and illegitimate conspiracy theories 
under the same label serves to delegitimize the more grounded ones and stigmatize their 
study. Parochial or private interests as a cause of war can be seen as a polite way to 
argue that a conspiracy existed and secretly operated to start a war. Most theories of 
private interests as the cause of war allege some form of conspiracy as actors within the 
state operate secretly on behalf of private, often financial, interests to “hijack the state” 
                                                        
10 “Engagements (Hansard, 15 January 2003)” (2003), 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/2003/jan/15/engagements. 
11 “Conspiracy Theory,” in Cambridge Dictionary Online, n.d., 11/24/2020, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/conspiracy-theory. 





and use foreign policy for parochial gains.14 The 1954 Guatemalan, US orchestrated 
coup marks the one of most demonstrable examples of this hijacking of foreign policy 
on behalf of private interests. In this case, the well-connected and influential United 
Fruit Company successfully lobbied the government to intervene in Guatemala to 
protect their assets from nationalization.15 In the years immediately following the coup, 
theories that proposed a conspiracy between the US state and the United Fruit Company 
could have been derided as just a conspiracy theory, but new revelations over the years 
have shown truth behind this ‘conspiracy theory.’ Conspiracy theory proves to be a 
broad and often silencing term which incorporates legitimate hypotheses that at least 
merit investigation and the absurd conspiracy theories that spring to mind when one 
first hears the term. Theories of private interests are theories of conspiracy, but they are 
not the irrational ‘conspiracy theories’ that the broad and silencing term implies. 
Official Justifications and Academic Explanations 
The consistent intrigue of the Iraq War comes in part from the complete 
inadequacy of the Bush Administration’s justifications for the war. The Iraq War clearly 
stands out as a major foreign policy event launched under false pretenses with some 
secret motive that both the public and academics have attempted to piece together. In 
the public sphere, the vague and unfounded association between Iraq and al Qaeda and 
humanitarian appeals about the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime helped justify the 
war. As the primary legal justification for the war, the Bush Administration alleged that 
                                                        
14 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, UNITED 
STATES: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uoregon/detail.action?docID=3138488. 
15 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, 




“Saddam Hussein possessed, or was aggressively pursuing, weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).”16 In time, each one of these justifications fell apart. No evidence 
supported a connection between the Iraqi government and al Qaeda, but nevertheless, 
Vice President Cheney in 2001 interview on 60 Minutes insinuated a connection by 
discussing an alleged 2001 meeting in Prague between Iraqi intelligence and one of the 
9/11 hijackers.17 The US’s own human rights abuses during the Iraq War make any 
claim of humanitarian intervention dubious. For example, under both Saddam Hussein 
and the US occupation, the notorious Abu Ghraib prison was used for torture. After the 
invasion, the US found no WMDs in Iraq and that justification was “proven to be 
false.”18 Additionally, a few leaked documents demonstrate the Bush Administration’s 
long-term focus on invading Iraq and a willingness to bend the facts to justify their 
decided course of action. The now infamous Downing Street Memo revealed that “the 
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” of invading Iraq.19 In the 
hours following the September 11th terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld penned a memo querying whether the attacks were “good enough [to] hit 
SH[Saddam Hussein] at same time - not only UBL[Osama bin Laden]” and stating the 
need to “go massive - sweep it all up, things related and not."20 Time and these 
documents have shown the Bush Administration’s justifications to be faulty at best and 
                                                        
16 Joshua Kameel, “The Iraq War: Bad Intelligence or Bad Policy?,” American Intelligence Journal 32, 
no. 1 (2015): 79–86. 
17 “Vice President Cheney on 60 Minutes II,” CBS’s 60 Minutes, November 14, 2001, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114.html. 
18 Kameel, “The Iraq War.” 
19 David Manning and Matthew Rycroft, “The Secret Downing Street Memo,” n.d., 3. 
20 Julian Borger, “Blogger Bares Rumsfeld’s Post 9/11 Orders,” The Guardian, February 24, 2006, sec. 




fabricated at worst leading to the vigorous public and academic debates over the true 
causes of the Iraq War.  
In the years following the invasion and the collapse of the official justifications 
for the war, academics forwarded a healthy number of theories to explain the “deeply 
puzzling decision” to invade Iraq.21 These hypotheses about the origins of the Iraq War 
cover a broad spectrum of theories on the causes of war. Some put forward explanations 
which attribute the war to the acute psychology of President Bush and a proposed desire 
to finish the job his father started in Iraq. Many emphasize the importance of the cadre 
of neoconservatives who rose to power in the Bush White House and the ideas they 
brought with them. Neoconservatism proposed using American military might “to 
promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad” by forcibly toppling 
regimes opposed to those ideals.22 Others pinpoint a belief in exorcising the demons of 
the Vietnam War and reasserting American primacy within top policymakers as the 
cause of the war.23 While usually featuring prominently in discussions over the causes 
of war, a standard, structuralism realist argument which attributes war to competition 
for power or security between states pursuing their national interest in an anarchic 
system remains conspicuously absent. In the New York Times on February 2nd of 2003, 
renowned realists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt presented the realist case against 
                                                        
21 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
22 Project for the New American Century, “PNAC-----Statement of Principles,” June 3, 1997, 2. 
23 Jane K. Cramer and Edward C. Duggan, “In Pursuit of Primacy: Why the United States Invaded Iraq,” 
in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Florence, UNITED STATES: Taylor & Francis Group, 
2011); Edward C. Duggan, “The War Lobby: Iraq and the Pursuit of U.S. Primacy” (Ph.D., United States 





the Iraq War and for “vigilant containment.”24 Under a realist paradigm, Mearsheimer 
and Walt lay out how the war would accomplish little and would reduce the US’s 
security and harm its national interests.25 The Iraq War and its consequences have 
justified their concerns. Some like Michael Klare focus on the US’s doctrine of 
controlling the global flow of oil show why the US would have a national interest in 
invading Iraq as an addendum to realist theory.26 Some lay out theories of parochial 
interests as an explanation for cases like the Iraq War where realism fails to easily 
explain the war. Jack Snyder puts forward a model for explaining this type of 
counterproductive overexpansion that wouldn’t be predicted under a realist 
framework.27 “Though overexpansion hurts the society as a whole, it is attractive to 
some groups within society” and through some means, these narrow groups get their 
policy vision implemented.28 Folk theories of private interests generally fall into this 
idea of a narrow interest pursuing their financial interests despite the costs to society or 
the country as a whole. These types of theories of private or parochial interests run into 
the challenge of explaining how a narrow and small interest can define foreign policy 
decisions for an entire state. 
The most fleshed out and widely discussed theory of parochial interests within 
the academic discussion relating to the invasion of Iraq and U.S.’s Middle East policy 
                                                        
24 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Opinion | Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box (Published 
2003),” The New York Times, February 2, 2003, sec. Opinion, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/02/opinion/keeping-saddam-hussein-in-a-box.html. 
25 Mearsheimer and Walt. 
26 Michael T. Klare, “Blood for Oil, in Iraq and Elsewhere,” in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? 
(Routledge, 2011). “The geopolitical objective of maintaining control over the entire Persian Gulf region” 
certainly could be seen as a reasonable explanation for the war. This particular accounting of the Iraq War 
places a great emphasis on the US’s desire to dominate the flow of oil and the Persian Gulf region. 





more broadly is John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s Israel Lobby theory.29 They see 
a basic contradiction in U.S. policy as it puts Israel’s interests before the US’s own and 
they claim that this is “due primarily to U.S. domestic politics and especially to the 
activities of the ‘Israel lobby’” and that the Iraq War marks one such example of the 
effectiveness of the lobby.30 They are aware of the twofold problem of assessing the 
Israel lobby as a parochial interest. They must tackle “the charge of antisemitism” 
which the lobby wields effectively to silence criticism of Israel.31 They also must clarify 
“the lobby’s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in antisemitic tracts like 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.32 They argue the Israel Lobby is not a conspiracy at 
all, but just another interest within “the interest-group tradition that has long governed 
American political life.”33 Mearsheimer and Walt lay out how the Israel lobby sought 
the war and exercised power over the U.S.’s foreign policy decision making process. 
Through lobbying organizations like AIPAC, the lobby can “reward legislators and 
congressional candidates who support its agenda and to punish those who challenge 
it.”34 They further explain various direct connections between members of the Bush 
Administration and the lobby through prominent neoconservatives.  This theory 
intersects with the neoconservatism based theory as for figures like “Paul Wolfowitz 
and Douglas Feith, the number two and three civilians in the Pentagon,” protecting 
                                                        
29 While this thesis primarily addresses theories of parochial interests where the private or parochial 
interest is a particular business or financial interests, the Israel lobby theory fits the broader paradigm of a 
narrow interest warping foreign policy to its own ends. The neoliberal theory discussed in this thesis 
bridged a similar gap between ideology and parochial interest.  
30 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Middle East 
Policy 13, no. 3 (September 22, 2006): 29–60. 
31 Mearsheimer and Walt. 
32 Mearsheimer and Walt. 
33 Mearsheimer and Walt. 




Israel played an essential role in their neoconservative vision for the Middle East.35 
According to Mearsheimer and Walt, the Israel lobby exerted a clear influence over 
foreign policy decisions like the one to invade Iraq through both the legislature and the 
White House. They arrive at the conclusion that “the lobby’s actions were a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for war.”36 While an unsatisfying conclusion, it indicates 
that by nature the study of parochial interests is unlikely to provide definite conclusions 
about the causes of war. The “overall persuasiveness of the Israel Lobby depends 
largely on its demonstrating the lobby’s power in presidential decisions on national 
security and high foreign policy issues” which isn’t entirely convincing.37 While the 
Israel lobby clearly wielded a fair amount of influence, the evidence does not quite 
show that the lobby determined the actions of the chief policy makers behind the war 
like Cheney and Rumsfeld. 
Challenges 
A few challenges immediately present themselves when investigating the role of 
private interests as the cause of the Iraq War. First, finding definitive evidence that 
shows a precise, causal connection between a private interest and the war proves 
difficult. A clear revelation or decisive evidence of private interests playing a crucial 
role in the decision making behind the Iraq War would be disastrous for the politicians 
and industries involved. Accordingly, private interests and government officials prove 
to be cagey and secretive about their connections and conversations. Vice President 
                                                        
35 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2007. 
36 Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” September 22, 2006. 
37 Jerome Slater, “Explaining the Iraq War: The Israel Lobby Theory,” in Why Did the United States 




Cheney as one of the chief decision makers behind the war exemplified this secretive 
behavior as his motives and precise beliefs remain difficult to discern. The presence of 
multiple interests being at play within the Bush Administration or even within a single 
actor makes motives even harder to pinpoint. Strong evidence shows decision makers 
like Cheney to have ideological commitments that led to them pushing for the war as 
well as financial interests in the war for example. Naomi Klein’s theory centered around 
neoliberal ideology presents a highly entangled version of this where she argues that for 
the proponents of this ideology, private, business interests and the national interest are 
one and the same.38 If, in the future, some leaked document proved the war to have been 
the direct result of the Bush Administration working to aid a private interest, this 
research evaluating multiple theories of private interests would be unnecessary, but no 
definitive evidence has surfaced. A leaked email or tell-all memoir from someone 
intimately involved in the decision-making process could provide more certain evidence 
of the war’s origins. 
Methods 
The challenges that arise in this type of research into private interests shape the 
form this thesis takes. While no universal and formulaic method exists across the 
evaluation of all the theories considered due to their diversity, a common approach can 
be seen. Each section attempts to pinpoint and precisely describe a popular theory of 
private interests as the cause of the Iraq War before presenting the best evidence 
available to support that theory and weighing the strength of that evidence. The 
                                                        




presentation of the evidence in support of each theory will follow a generally consistent 
process of showing a particular private interest’s incentives to support the war and what 
benefits, typically profits, they reaped from the decision to go to war. Next, the 
influence of the particular interest in the US foreign policy making process will be 
demonstrated with a particular focus on imbedded actors within the Bush 
Administration which fundamentally made the decision to invade Iraq. Many in 
academia, the public, and former Bush Administration officials like Colonel Lawrence 
Wilkerson describe “a ‘Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal’ that hijacked US foreign policy” and 
thus, the beliefs, interests, and actions of these actors should be given the most weight.39 
Each section will also show what evidence directly connects the influential private 
interest and this decision before assessing the merits of the theory in question in light of 
the evidence available. Despite these commonalities, each section varies significantly as 
each theory differs. Some require a specific refutation of a common reason for their 
academic dismissal and others fall into a particular narrative that must be established. 
This thesis aspires to honestly present and evaluate a set of common theories of private 
interests as the true cause of the Iraq War. By presenting the Big Oil theory, the arms 
lobby theory, the Cheney-Halliburton theory, and the neoliberal ideology theory, 
significant progress can be made toward divining whether private interests played a role 
in the decision to invade Iraq and to what extent these interests influenced policy, but a 
certain limit to what this research can reveal remains as key motivations and pieces of 
information are unknown. 
                                                        





Evaluating the Big Oil Folk Theory 
Before and after the initial invasion of Iraq, catchy phrases like ‘No Blood for 
Oil’ featured prominently in anti-war protests and many accept oil as the definitive 
cause of the war without a particularly in-depth analysis or even a precise explanation 
of why and how oil caused the invasion of Iraq.40 In colloquial discussion about the Iraq 
War and its causes, the subject of oil will inevitably arise. This folk theory makes the 
obvious connection between Iraq’s immense oil reserves and self-serving, influential 
American oil companies, but as folk theories, they do not examine the situation all the 
evidence available to support or refute the hypothesis that oil or more specifically, Big 
Oil, caused the second Gulf War.41 While many academics have skirted around 
considering this hypothesis at all, those that discuss it tend to have “summarily 
dismissed the ‘oil hypothesis’ without analysis.”42 Some academics when offering their 
own explanation for the Iraq War quickly refute the folk “oil hypothesis” with a brief 
explanation of how oil companies would prefer to just trade with Iraq and the 
assertation that little to no evidence exists of oil companies pushing the Bush 
Administration toward war. This section will attempt to complicate and refute the rapid 
dismissal of the “oil hypothesis” by showing how American oil companies stood to 
benefit from an invasion of Iraq as compared to the lifting of sanctions. Next, it will 
demonstrate how oil companies wielded significant influence over the Bush 
Administration before finally presenting the evidence that exists of these companies 
                                                        
40 “5 Photographs From The Day The World Said No To War.” 
41 ‘Big Oil’ refers to the massive oil companies which extract and sell petroleum around the world. In the 
context of this research, a particular focus is placed on American oil companies as they have the most 
sway on politicians in the US. Exxon Mobil and Chevron are two among the many companies that 
together form ‘Big Oil.’ 




using their influence to push the administration toward the war. While conclusive 
evidence does not exist of Big Oil being the driving or primary force behind the war as 
many in the public believe, a fair amount of evidence exists to show the industry’s 
interest in the war and their actions which may have contributed to the decision to 
invade Iraq. Through leaked documents and other sources, a picture of the oil industry 
working to cause the Iraq War can be pieced together, but due to the shroud of secrecy 
which cloaked the administration and industry’s actions, definitive proof remains 
elusive. 
This section will evaluate the common hypothesis that profit-seeking oil 
companies and their allies in the White House pushed for the Iraq War and reveal the 
complicated reality of the relationship between Big Oil and the Iraq War. It should be 
noted that this section will deal with oil as the folk theory sees it: a source of profit for 
self-interested corporations.43 The theory which will be evaluated in this section differs 
from but remains interconnected with other oil theories which argue oil’s geostrategic 
value or its importance to a stable global economy motivated the US to seek control over 
Iraq and its oil.44 Despite the value of these alternative oil theories, this section focuses 
on just the narrow hypothesis that the US invaded Iraq “to ensure that U.S. companies 
would have access to Iraqi oil” at the behest of a small cadre of powerful decision makers 
with strong ties to the oil sector within the Bush Administration.45 This section will start 
by refuting the claim that Iraq War had nothing to do with oil as many politicians in the 
                                                        
43 Antonia Juhasz, “Why the War in Iraq Was Fought for Big Oil,” CNN Digital, March 19, 2013, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html. 
44 Klare, “Blood for Oil, in Iraq and Elsewhere.” 
45 Edward C. Duggan, “The War Lobby: Iraq and the Pursuit of U.S. Primacy” (Ph.D., United States -- 





United States and Britain asserted during the early years of the war by showing that oil 
factored into the decision making process in at least some capacity as proven by evidence 
which came to light over the years. Having established that oil factored into the decision 
making in some capacity, this section will discuss and complicate the common refutation 
of the Big Oil hypothesis that oil corporations “wanted to make money, not war,” and 
preferred the lifting of sanctions to military intervention as a means of accessing Iraqi 
oil.46 Next, this section will discuss how the control over Iraqi oil played out in the years 
following the invasion and the refutation to the Big Oil folk theory this raises as “the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq has not created the bonanza for multinational oil and gas 
corporations that many anticipated.”47 The evidence indicates that a plan existed for 
American oil companies to dominate Iraqi oil and this plan along with the Bush 
Administrations’ nation building project fell apart. Finally, this section will examine the 
extent to which the oil industry held influence over the Bush Administration and what 
evidence exists of the industry using that influence to lobby for the invasion of Iraq. The 
folk theory that attributes the Iraq War to the influence of oil companies, while not 
entirely convincing primarily due to lack of smoking gun evidence, deserves far more 
consideration than the academics and politicians who quickly dismiss it grant. The 
evidence available shows both a financial interest in the war from Big Oil and 
demonstrates some collaboration between the Bush Administration on Iraq policy. 
Despite many questions remaining about the administration’s relationship with Big Oil, 
the evidence suggests the industry did play a role in the decision to invade Iraq.  
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It’s not not about Oil 
In the lead up to and the years immediately following the war, those in the 
governments primarily responsible for the invasion of Iraq frequently denied that the 
war had anything to do with oil as so many anti-war protesters claimed. In Britain, Tony 
Blair in December of 2003 claimed the war had “nothing to do with oil.”48 In the United 
States, Donald Rumsfeld in a 2002 interview called the idea that the US targeted Iraq 
due to its oil reserves “nonsense” and he claimed that “it has nothing to do with oil, 
literally nothing to do with oil.”49 “Bush administration officials were adamant in their 
insistence that oil played no role in the US planning” or motivations for the invasion 
and eventual occupation of Iraq.50 To openly reveal an oil motive while still in power, 
even a geostrategic or stability oriented motive, would be scandalous and delegitimize 
their policy and the war. These denials would likely come from these politicians 
regardless whether oil factored into the decision making process or not as they would 
seek to dissuade the idea of oil being the motive for the war either way. The public 
denial of the invasion of Iraq having anything to do with oil while expected stands in 
sharp contrast with the raw evidence that at the very least some members of the Bush 
Administration focused on planning for the fate of Iraq’s oil reserves before the 
invasion.  
                                                        
48 “Engagements (Hansard, 15 January 2003)” (2003), 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/2003/jan/15/engagements. 
49 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Interview with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on Infinity Radio, 14 
November 2002, interview by Steve Croft, Radio, November 14, 2002, 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/infinity.htm. 





In 2007, Alan Greenspan, the longtime Chair of the Federal Reserve, wrote that 
“I’m saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: 
The Iraq war is largely about oil.”51 While not coming from an individual directly 
involved in foreign policy, Greenspan’s book makes a rare acknowledgement of the 
importance of oil in the decision to invade Iraq. Greenspan went on to clarify that oil 
and Iraq were “important for the global economy” rather than as a lucrative cash grab 
for American companies as folk theories tend to suggest.52 General John Abizaid who 
served as the commander of US CENTCOM from 2003 to 2007 gave a speech about the 
Iraq War where he admitted that “Of course it’s about oil, we can’t really deny that.”53 
Like with Greenspan’s admission, precisely what role oil played in Abizaid’s opinion 
remains unclear. Nevertheless, the mere acknowledgement of oil as an important factor 
marks a sharp departure from the Bush Administration’s outright denial of oil as a 
factor.  
Beyond just a written acknowledgement of the importance of oil in relation to 
the decision to invade Iraq by a high-ranking member of the Bush Administration, 
pieces of information have come to light in the years after the war which show “U.S. 
decision makers were keenly interested in Iraqi oil before the war” despite their public 
denial of that interest.54 Vice-President Cheney’s Energy Task Force demonstrates the 
administration's interest in Iraqi oil before the war. Cheney chaired the highly secretive 
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task force which included and met with executives from top oil companies such as 
British Petroleum and Exxon.55 The task force examined maps of Iraqi oil fields and 
lists of the foreign companies who held the contracts controlling those oil fields in early 
2001.  “The efforts made by American forces to seize Iraqi oil fields in the early days of 
the fighting and to establish control over other elements of Iraq's far-flung petroleum 
infrastructure” reveal that the Bush Administration prioritized controlling Iraqi oil to 
some extent, but whether oil represented a security concern or economic concern for 
private interests remains unclear.56 It stands to reason that “the largest oil consuming 
country in the world would not invade the country with the second largest oil reserves 
in the world and perhaps the least explored oil prospects in the world without any 
consideration of the possibilities for oil” and to deny oil outright as a factor makes the 
Bush Administration seem more suspicious than an acknowledgement of oil as a 
valuable strategic resource.57 These instances show that oil factored heavily into the 
considerations of the Bush Administration before the war which contradicts the public 
line taken by the administration, however, oil’s exact role is less clear. 
                                                        
55 “Meetings With Vice President Cheney’s Energy Task Force (Washingtonpost.Com),” The 
Washington Post, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/cheney_energy_task_force.html. 
56 Michael T. Klare, “Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The Continuing Salience of the Carter 
Doctrine,” International Journal 62, no. 1 (2006): 31–42, https://doi.org/10.2307/40204243. 
57 Edward C. Duggan, “The War Lobby: Iraq and the Pursuit of U.S. Primacy” (Ph.D., United States -- 
Oregon, University of Oregon, 2011), 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/907553652/abstract/7A141C6F58074BFEPQ/2. The ordering of the 
sizes of various oil reserves is a fairly debatable topic as they can be defined and distinguished in a 




Invading Iraq: Potentially Profitable for Oil Companies or not? 
Tony Blair, in denying securing profits for oil companies as a motive for the 
invasion of Iraq, stated that it would be “infinitely simpler to cut a deal with Saddam.”58 
Academics often use this argument to quickly dismiss the Big Oil Folk Theory and the 
question of “Why wouldn’t U.S. oil corporations just buy it from Iraq” does have some 
merit.59 Oil companies seek to profit from the extraction and sale of oil and will happily 
do business with unsavory regimes to ensure the flow of oil and profits.60 Oil 
companies, if they sought Iraqi oil, would simply “demand an end to Iraqi sanctions in 
order to facilitate trade” rather than lobby for a controversial and costly war which 
could jeopardize oil production in the region through creating instability.61 This 
argument has strong logical underpinnings and some evidence exists of the oil lobby 
seeking to lift sanctions to gain access to Iraqi oil. As the CEO of Haliburton, Dick 
Cheney “consistently opposed unilateral American sanctions” as they stopped American 
companies from being able to do business in and profit off of rogue states like Iraq.62 
Some reports also indicate that “Saddam Hussein wanted to make a deal” which would 
give American companies rights to Iraqi oil and minerals in early 2003 in an attempt to 
prevent the invasion, but no serious deal was ever on the table.63 At a quick glance, 
                                                        
58 “Engagements (Hansard, 15 January 2003)” (2003), 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/2003/jan/15/engagements. 
59 Norman Solomon, Target Iraq: What the News Media Didn’t Tell You (New York: Context Books : 
Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2003). 
60 John J. Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2007). 
61 Norman Solomon, Target Iraq: What the News Media Didn’t Tell You (New York: Context Books : 
Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2003). 
62 Christopher Marquis, “The Record: Over the Years, Cheney Opposed U.S. Sanctions,” The New York 
Times, July 27, 2000, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/072700wh-
cheney-embargo.html. 
63 James Risen, “THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: DIPLOMACY; Iraq Said to Have Tried to Reach Last-




lifting sanctions seems like a much more surefire path to accessing Iraqi oil as 
compared to invasion, but a handful of factors which the proponents of this refutation 
neglect to consider made an invasion a much more lucrative prospect for oil companies 
than just the lifting of sanctions.  
Before complicating this refutation, Big Oil’s interest in Iraqi oil should be 
established. As the CEO of Halliburton, future Vice President Cheney gave a speech in 
1999 in which he laid out exactly why the Middle East “is still where the prize 
ultimately lies” in terms of oil production.64 Chevron CEO Kenneth Derr, in a 1998 
speech, stated that “Iraq possesses huge reserves of oil and gas-reserves I’d love 
Chevron to have access to.”65 Iraq’s immense and underdeveloped oil reserves made it 
an obvious target for American oil companies in a world rapidly running out of new oil 
fields to develop.66 
Under the Clinton Administration in the 90s, lobbying for the lifting of sanctions 
seemed to be the most plausible avenue to access Iraqi oil, but after the arrival of the 
Bush Administration and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, invasion became a 
serious option. Without the window granted by 9/11,  the Bush Administration would 
have struggled to build the case for war as the nonexistent but widely believed 
connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq in part justified the war in the eyes of the 
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public.67 One can see how lifting sanctions may have been the most expedient path to 
Iraqi oil in the nineties, but after 9/11 and realizing “the futility of eliminating the 
sanctions regime,” the oil industry may have seen invasion as the best way to access 
Iraq’s reserves.68 Additionally, the years of sanctions and public condemnations of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime would make a sudden shifting to normalizing relations and 
lifting sanctions politically infeasible. 
Exactly who held the oil contracts in Saddam’s Iraq must also be considered. 
Before the American invasion, Iraq “signed several multi-billion-dollar deals with 
foreign oil companies, mainly from China, France and Russia.”69 Companies like the 
Russian Lukoil and the French Total Fina Elf dominated Iraqi oil through deals signed 
with Iraq’s national oil company.70 Likely because of these contracts, both France and 
Russia opposed the US’s invasion. If Iraq maintained these contracts, American 
companies would be left out of Iraqi oil far into the future even if the US lifted 
sanctions. Dick Cheney, his Energy Task Force, and oil executives possessed an acute 
awareness of this fact as they poured over the lists of these contracts in 2001.71 The 
overthrow of the Hussein regime presented an opportunity to toss out those contracts 
under a new, friendly government and grant American companies a chance to control 
Iraqi oil in a way just lifting sanctions could not.  
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Finally, “the ‘de-monopolization’ or the ‘de-nationalization’ of the Iraqi 
National Oil Corporation” could lead to profits that were far greater than anything that 
could be accomplished by working through Iraq’s national oil company.72 By 
privatizing the Iraqi oil industry, US oil companies would “see vast possibilities beyond 
making limited profits buying oil from a nationalized company.”73 Instead of being 
forced to work through the Iraqi National Oil Corporation and Saddam Hussein if the 
US lifted sanctions, an invasion could allow for the privatization of Iraqi oil industry. 
The US pushed for the privatization of Iraqi oil throughout the occupation under the 
guise of “restructuring.”74 Despite the evidence that indicates the oil lobby wanted to 
lift sanctions to access Iraqi oil, the existing Iraqi contracts being dominated by foreign 
competitors and the possibility for privatizing the Iraqi oil industry made an invasion of 
Iraq a more appealing policy to the oil industry as compared to the lifting of sanctions in 
post-9/11 world which provided the window necessary for war. 
The Plan versus What Happened in Iraq 
The Bush Administration had a specific vision for how the invasion, occupation, 
and reconstruction of Iraq would play out. To their credit, the American military 
quickly invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime with few military 
difficulties, but from that point on, the administration’s plan fell apart. While American 
oil companies have not dominated Iraqi oil or experienced a particular boon in profits, 
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this results from the failure of the Bush Administration to enact its plan rather than 
proving that the administration lacked designs to maximize profits for American oil 
corporations by invading Iraq.75 Oil prices, however, which some cite as a sign of oil 
companies profiting, grew from $27.77 per barrel in 2003 to $92.57 in 2008.76 The 
invasion of Iraq and the “subsequent hike in oil prices” gives some credence to the idea 
the oil companies benefitted from the decision to invade Iraq, but the profits of oil 
companies from Iraq proves to be far less evident the lay proponent of the Big Oil 
hypothesis would anticipate.77 The result of “higher prices and greater profits” fits the 
Big Oil theory, however the oil industry never realized their alleged goal of controlling 
Iraqi oil production.78 
The Bush Administration proposed a transformative vision for Iraq which 
included transforming Iraq into a Western style, free market democracy and part of that 
process would be privatizing Iraq’s oil industry. For some important decision makers 
within the Bush Administration such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
“Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress,” featured prominently as a 
potential future leader of Iraq after an American invasion.79 As an Iraqi exile, Chalabi 
spent years pushing for the invasion of Iraq and actively participating in the creation 
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and propagation of the myth that Iraq possessed WMDs.80 In both Chalabi’s mind and 
the minds of some members of the Bush Administration, Chalabi would lead Iraq after 
an American invasion and Chalabi started to trade on this status as heir apparent in Iraq 
before the war even started.81 In October of 2002, Chalabi reportedly “met executives of 
three US oil multinationals to negotiate the carve-up of Iraq's massive oil reserves.”82 
Other indications of the plan for Iraq come from Bush Administration aligned think 
tanks like the Heritage Foundation which put forward “a road map for the privatization 
of Iraq's nationalized oil industry.”83 The State Department established the “Working 
Group on Oil and Energy, a cadre of pro-American expatriate Iraqi oil managers” to 
create “the guidelines for the privatization of the Iraqi oil industry.”84 A clear plan 
existed for the privatization of the Iraqi National Oil company which, if implemented, 
would have parceled out control over Iraqi oil fields to, primarily American, foreign 
companies. Even in 2006, the US continued to angle for the privatization of Iraqi oil 
when the Iraq Study Group’s report argued that “the United States should assist Iraqi 
leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise.”85 American 
companies before the war stood to benefit from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the 
US planned to not only open up Iraq to American companies but to privatize the 
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national oil company under a new Iraqi government as well. Some oil companies likely 
felt confident in their ability to profit from the invasion of Iraq as after meeting with 
Ahmed Chalabi, as he promised to “reward the US for removing Saddam with lucrative 
oil contracts.”86 
Despite these plans to privatize Iraqi oil and hand out the spoils to American 
corporations, the Bush Administration and its various representatives in Iraq failed to 
achieve the oil privatization they sought. The United States via the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq pushed for the privatization of Iraqi oil like other 
previously state-owned enterprises. But the Iraqi people would not “accept privatization 
of the oil sector.”87 Labor unions formed “the main opposition to the occupation's 
economic agenda” which centered around the Iraqi National Oil company for the 
obvious reason of the prominence of oil in Iraq.88 The Iraqi oil industry became an 
“important symbol of Iraq's national identity, and, more importantly, the only source of 
income capable of financing the country's post-occupation reconstruction.”89 While the 
Bush Administration succeeded in privatizing many other functions of the Iraqi 
government, they failed with the all-important oil industry due to labor strikes in the 
context of the insurgency. The privatization and carve up of the Iraqi National Oil 
Company would galvanize the anti-American insurgency and confirm the resistors of 
the American occupations’ suspicions of the US’s intentions to take Iraqi oil by force.90 
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Over the years following the invasion of Iraq, the US would learn it “could not privatize 
Iraq’s oil by fiat when Iraqi politicians refused to do it themselves.”91 The Bush 
Administration failed to privatize the Iraqi National Oil company as it planned and thus, 
the Iraqi people denied American oil companies the windfall they may have expected 
from the invasion of Iraq.  
A state of flux defines the history of who held Iraqi oil contracts since the 
invasion of Iraq. In 2008, “Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total and BP the original partners in the 
Iraq Petroleum Company” before its nationalization in the 70s along with a number of 
other Western companies received “no-bid contracts to service Iraq’s largest fields.”92 
Their return would seem to confirm the common suspicion “among many in the Arab 
world and among parts of the American public that the United States had gone to war in 
Iraq precisely to secure the oil wealth these contracts seek to extract.”93 Western 
dominance, however, did not last long as the makeup of international companies 
holding contracts in Iraq rapidly diversified. Nearly two decades after the start of the 
war, French, Chinese, Russian, British, Dutch, Malaysian, American, and other foreign 
oil companies all work contracts to extract petroleum from Iraq.94 The American 
dominance proponents of the Big Oil theory predicted never materialized, but 
ExxonMobil does work the lucrative West Qurna Field which remains the single most 
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profitable oil field in Iraq.95 The Iraq “War has not resulted in a bonanza for U.S. oil 
companies” due to the failures of the Bush Administration in implementing their plan 
for Iraqi oil rather than a lack of intent.96 The old contracts reviewed by Cheney and the 
industry executives on his task force from the Saddam Hussein regime were thrown out, 
but American oil companies failed to permanently supplant them.  
Conflict of Interests, Cooperation, but no Definitive Causal Link 
While far from the clear-cut case proponents of the Big Oil theory propose, 
American oil companies did have an economic interest in the decision to invade Iraq, 
but the evidence showing them pushing for that decision proves to be extant but less 
than airtight. Several connections can be drawn between the Bush Administration and 
the American oil industry. Some scholars and many journalists characterize Bush and 
Cheney as “oil politicians” who worked in government but often represented the 
interests of the oil industry.97 They operate under the assumption that there was “no 
distinction between the national interests of the United States and that of the domestic 
oil industry” and in pursuit of this unified interest, they allegedly use the government to 
enact policies like tax subsidies, removing regulations which harm the oil industry, or 
even war to benefit Big Oil.98 The Iraq War represents a potential zenith of the merging 
of US interests and oil industry’s interests in the minds of these crucial “oil 
politicians.”99 “Former energy company officials” pervaded the highest levels of the 
                                                        
95 “List of Oil and Gas Fields in Iraq | Iraq Business News.” 
96 Bonds, “Assessing the Oil Motive After the U.S. War in Iraq.” 
97 Duggan, “The War Lobby.” 
98 Duggan. Naomi Klein forwards a similar characterization of national and private interests being 





Bush Administration.100 President George W. Bush founded Arbusto Energy, a 
relatively small oil exploration firm. Vice President Cheney spent the time between the 
first and second Bush Administration running Haliburton, an oil and gas services 
company. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor turned Secretary of State, 
served on the Chevron board of directors until 2001.101 A clear set of connections 
existed between the oil industry and the Bush Administration. In the 2000 election, 
“Bush has raised 15 times more money from oil and gas interests than Vice President Al 
Gore” which shows a clear preference from the oil industry for one of their own.102 The 
oil industry felt they would have “a bold and willing partner in securing and 
maintaining access to oil” in a George W. Bush administration and made a significant 
effort to ensure his electoral success.103 While the career and campaign connections 
between the Bush Administration and the oil industry reveal a potential conflict of 
interests and how the oil industry likely expected favorable policy from the new 
administration, it far from confirms the idea the Bush Administration decided to invade 
Iraq on behalf of oil companies.  
Vice President Cheney’s Energy Task Force provides some evidence of 
cooperation and communication between the Bush Administration and the oil industry 
before the invasion of Iraq. In the early days of the Bush Administration, President 
Bush formed the Task Force to be headed by Cheney with a goal to “develop a national 
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energy policy designed to help the private sector, and, as necessary and appropriate, 
State and local governments, promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally 
sound production and distribution of energy for the future.”104 The inclusion of aiding 
the private sector as an explicit goal further demonstrates the Bush Administration’s 
interest in supporting the oil industry. The Report of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group(Cheney’s Energy Task Force) also advised the President to urge 
other oil producers in the Middle East to “open up areas of their energy sectors to 
foreign investment.”105 In the spring of 2001, Vice President Cheney’s task force met 
with a wide array of individuals and groups. Oil and gas business executives featured 
heavily as the task force met with executives from Exxon Mobil, BP, and Shell among 
others.106 In 2002, the Commerce Department turned over documents from the Spring 
2001 meetings of the Energy Task Force. These documents reveal that Cheney’s Energy 
Task Force reviewed maps of Iraqi oil fields and a list of “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi 
Oilfield Contracts.”107 The list of foreign companies which stood to receive all of the 
Iraqi oil contracts if Saddam Hussein remained in power represents an explicit problem 
faced by American oil companies which an invasion could solve. Iraq threatened to 
completely block the American oil industry from accessing “the third largest reserves of 
conventional petroleum in the world,” while foreign competitors like Russia’s Lukoil 
and France’s TotalFinaElf received the majority of the Iraqi contracts. While these 
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documents show some collaboration and joint focus on Iraqi oil from the Bush 
Administration and the oil industry, they do not show anything definitive about the 
decision to go to war. According to some oil industry officials, in October of 2002, “Mr. 
Cheney's staff held a meeting in October with Exxon Mobil Corporation, 
ChevronTexaco Corporation, ConocoPhillips, Haliburton,” and others, but the 
companies and government officials involved deny this meeting happened.108 If this 
meeting occurred, it would place Cheney and his staff in the room with oil executives 
much closer to the start of the war.  
Jane Mayer uncovered perhaps the most blatant connection between the decision 
to invade Iraq and the oil industry in the form of a February 3, 2001 memo from a 
“high-level N.S.C. official” concerning Cheney’s Energy Task Force.109 This revealing 
memo directed “the N.S.C. staff to cooperate fully with the Energy Task Force as it 
considered the ‘melding’of two seemingly unrelated areas of policy: ‘the review of 
operational policies towards rogue states,’ such as Iraq, and ‘actions regarding the 
capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.’”110 This memo reveals a level of 
cooperation between the members of the Energy Task Force which included plenty of 
oil industry representatives and the Bush Administration on foreign policy toward 
countries like Iraq in particular. There is not a “smoking gun that uncovers an oil 
company executive sitting down with George W. Bush and telling him to invade Iraq or 
Iran so that the oil company can have the nation’s oil,” but this example of collaboration 
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comes close.111 Despite their insistence to the contrary, the Bush Administration 
focused on Iraqi oil and even discussed it with representatives from the industry and 
seemingly involved them in foreign policy.  
The secrecy of the Bush Administration and of Cheney’s Energy Task Force has 
played a significant role in creating and fostering the public suspicion of the 
administration and their relationship with Big Oil. A perfectly legitimate meeting could 
have happened between Cheney and members of the oil industry. Some level of 
communication and consultation between government and industry experts makes 
sense, but if these meetings were innocent, a transparent approach would help dispel the 
suspicion of the public. Instead of taking a transparent approach, Cheney’s Task Force 
took the opposite approach of maximum secrecy and the few details available of their 
activities result from Freedom of Information Act requests and investigative journalism 
rather than voluntary transparency.  
Evaluating the Big Oil Factor 
Academics like Mearsheimer and Walt who quickly dismiss the Big Oil theory 
out of hand and the common belief in this theory by the public both prove too 
absolutist. A real foundation exists for “the intuitive connection between oil and the Iraq 
war,” but no definitive evidence exists which connects the oil industry and the Bush 
Administration’s decision to go to war.112 The nature of this research makes definitive 
conclusions unlikely as that would require novel, decisive evidence such as a confession 
from the chief decision-makers behind the war in Iraq or a key, leaked document. It 
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stands to reason if the war was in fact about securing profits for oil companies as the 
folk theory suggests, they would go to great lengths to conceal that motive and the 
evidence that could confirm it. The people behind the decision to invade Iraq like 
Rumsfeld deny oil as a motive, but quotes from other officials, the administration’s 
actions, and the logical connection between the oil hungry US and the oil rich Iraq 
disprove this notion. The changing circumstances between the 90s and 2000s, the 
existing foreign contracts, and the possibility of privatizing Iraqi oil complicate the 
refutation to the Big Oil theory centered around a supposed preference from oil 
companies to just lift sanctions and buy oil from Saddam’s Iraq. The Bush 
Administration planned to privatize Iraqi oil and parcel out the lucrative oil reserves to, 
primarily, American companies, but its plans fell apart in the face of insurgency and 
resistance from labor groups in Iraq. The lack of a windfall of profits from the Iraq War 
for the oil industry resulted from the failure of the Bush Administration’s plans, not a 
lack of plans to benefit the industry. 113  While no definitive evidence exists of the Bush 
Administration deciding to invade Iraq on behalf of oil companies, strong connections 
existed between the administration and the industry. Some documents even show a 
collaborative focus from the industry and administration in Cheney’s Energy Task 
Force on Iraqi oil. In all, the Big Oil theory of private interests deserves far more 
consideration than academics give it, but it remains uncertain as the Iraq War did not 
result in massive profits for the oil industry as the theory predicts and no damning 
evidence exists of the Bush Administration deciding to invade Iraq at the behest of Big 
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Oil. Cheney’s Energy Task Force and the leaked information about their meetings with 
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The Arms Lobby and the Iraq War 
The military industrial complex surfaces fairly frequently in the minds of the 
public as a cause of the Iraq War. The common arms lobby theory of the invasion of 
Iraq argues that influential defense manufacturing contractors used their influence over 
the government to push for the war to maximize their profits. This fits into a larger folk 
theory of US foreign policy which ascribes seemingly constant foreign wars and high 
military spending to the powerful arms industry which profits from that state of 
affairs.114 While widely believed to be true based on a cursory glance at American 
military spending and the industry’s influence, scholars rarely consider “the influence of 
the traditional arms makers” as an important factor in the decision to invade Iraq.115 It 
can be shown that the arms industry had some incentives push a the decision to invade 
and significant political influence over the executive branch and the legislature, 
however little evidence points to arms manufacturers as being a definitive, decisive, or 
even significant factor behind the war. The evidence available indicates that the 
influence of the arms lobby likely generally biased the US government toward 
militaristic foreign policy decisions like the invasion of Iraq.  
This section will first place the arms lobby theory in the context of another 
lobby theory which emphasize the influence of certain special interest groups within 
American domestic politics. It will use the Israel lobby as a model for evaluating the 
influence of a particular lobby over the decision to invade Iraq. Next, it will show what 
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incentives arms manufacturers had to drive the decision to invade Iraq. After showing 
that incentives existed for the military-industrial complex to push for war, this section 
will show what influence the arms lobby wielded in domestic politics over both the 
executive branch and the legislature. Finally, it will discuss the lack of direct evidence 
of this private interest being the primary or a significant cause of the Iraq War. The 
arms lobby or the military industrial complex refers to the American defense and 
aerospace contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumman, or Raytheon 
which build the weapons of war used by the US military. Generally speaking, there are 
three types of military contractors: “rebuilding and support contractors; private security 
contractors; and weapons makers,” but this section will just discuss the “weapons 
makers”.116 Some versions of this theory argue that the Defense Industry pushed for the 
Iraq War to stave off a post-Cold War reduction in military spending, but the US’s 
military interventions in the Balkans and the ongoing War in Afghanistan already 
proved this concern of the industry’s to be unfounded.  
Comparing Lobbies 
The arms lobby is just one among many lobbies representing narrow interests 
which play the political game of lobbying politicians to implement their preferred 
policies. As another lobby theory which attempts to explain the Iraq War, Mearsheimer 
and Walt’s Israel lobby theory provides a useful framing through which to investigate 
the arms lobby theory.117 They make the case that the Israel lobby, through its influence 
in the legislature and the White House, created the conditions necessary for the war, 
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although they do not conclude that the Israel lobby definitively caused the war.118 While 
the Israel lobby clearly holds significant power in American domestic politics, the case 
can be made that “oil companies and the arms industry exert far more economic and 
ideological influence over Washington’s policy in the Persian Gulf region than does the 
Israel lobby.”119 Mearsheimer and Walt show that the Israel Lobby had strong 
connections to the Bush Administration and through lobbying organizations like AIPAC 
held the “ability to reward legislators and congressional candidates who support its 
agenda and to punish those who challenge it.”120 The same can be said for the arms 
lobby. However, it should be noted that the interests of the Israel lobby and the arms 
lobby do intersect in maintaining “massive arms shipments to Israel” which keep Israel 
secure and weapons manufacturers’ profits high.121 The strength of the Israel Lobby 
theory in particular can be found in its connections to high profile neoconservatives 
within the Bush Administration who became prominent proponents of the war such as 
Paul Wolfowitz.122 Another comparative strength of the Israel Lobby can be found in its 
superior unity in aims and actions as compared to the arms lobby. While the arms lobby 
may share the general goal of increased military spending, each firm also competes with 
other elements of the industry for the same contracts. The Israel lobby theory provides a 
blueprint for the analysis of the influence of a particular lobby within US politics which 
can be used as a partial guide for examining the arms lobby folk theory. Comparing 
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these two lobbies can help reveal the relative merits of the arms lobby theory and 
provide a model on how a lobby’s influence can be measured. 
A Profitable War? 
In colloquial discussions, many assume war and profit to be one and the same 
for American arms manufacturers, but what incentives truly existed for the arms lobby 
to push for the invasion of Iraq? The popular argument goes that war needs weapons 
therefore the firms that sell weapons will support, push for, or even cause wars to 
maximize their profits. While this simplistic argument can be appealing, the arms 
lobby’s incentives to push for the 2003 invasion of Iraq prove to be less obvious but still 
extant. This subsection will describe the precise scenario facing the arms industry in the 
early 2000s which made pushing for war particularly attractive. It will also describe 
how the Iraq War and to a broader extent the Global War on Terror have played out in a 
near ideal manner for the arms lobby. 
American weapons manufacturers primarily rely on government contracts to 
produce weapons for their profits. The folk theory often follows the logic that war uses 
up weapons and thus, the military will have to buy more. But in the case of Iraq, the war 
itself used up relatively few weapons as the US easily won the military conflict in Iraq 
before the struggle of occupation began.123 The profits of the arms industry depend 
upon the US military spending billions of dollars purchasing and maintaining a wide 
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array of weapons from defense contractors. The arms industry makes up the largest part 
of “the network of interests benefitting from military spending” and they consistently 
fight to maintain high military spending through the arms lobby.124 For the most part, 
the lobby succeeds in its efforts as the military budgets and the profits of defense 
producers have consistently grown despite some minor dips since the end of World War 
II. The F-35 Fighter program demonstrates the strength of the lobbying power of 
Lockheed Martin in particular. Since the launch of the program in 1997, technical 
problems have marred the project and it has continually grown more and more 
expensive with little to show for it. During this time, Lockheed Martin spent millions on 
lobbying the members of Congress who were responsible for funding the program.125 
Their lobbying efforts kept a flailing program alive demonstrating the arms lobby’s 
acute ability to affect policy.126 The arms lobby clearly seeks higher military budgets, 
but it might not need to push for war to achieve that goal. The existence of high military 
budgets is “predicated on (and justified by) the presence of an external enemy” and this 
can be just a threat or an active war.127 Throughout the Cold War, the enemy presented 
by the Soviet Union along with the series of smaller wars justified a massive military 
budget. The habit of threat inflation in “corporate-backed conservative think tanks” 
which owe their funding to the defense industry serves this goal of increasing 
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budgets.128 Threat inflation can lead to war inadvertently, but war itself rather than just 
a threat provides the justification for increased military spending and the resulting 
increased profits for arms makers. Demonstrating the connection between the arms 
industry and the Iraq War relies on the necessity of “political justification” for military 
budgets.129 In the United States, the military budget must be justified somehow and 
absent a great power rival like the Soviet Union provided during the Cold War, the 
military budget lacks a clear justification. The arms lobby’s chief task is to maintain 
high military spending to maximize profits for the industry by whatever means 
necessary, but in certain situations, just a threat may not be enough to justify an ever-
growing military budget and pushing for war may be necessary to maintain high profits.  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced no peer rival or 
significant security threat from any other state. Some critics allege that this unipolar 
moment which they see as extending into the 2000s created a need for a new 
justification for military spending. The Iraq War served this role in maintaining the 
profits of the arms industry according to this theory. In the immediate post-Cold War 
period, many expected a reduction in military spending and a “peace dividend” where 
the money once spent on arms racing and competing militarily with the USSR could be 
invested in non-military government programs and generally work for the domestic 
betterment of the US.130 Of course, any reduction to military spending would jeopardize 
the profits of the military-industrial complex, but without any clear rival or threat 
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presenting itself in the late nineties, politicians would likely struggle to justify massive 
military spending to their constituents. The military budget “which declined by 17 
percent under George H.W. Bush and by 12 percent during the first term of the Clinton 
Administration” could not be brought to even greater heights and greater profits for the 
industry without a new justification for high spending.131 No severe drop off would 
occur as the military intervention Bosnia kept the military budget roughly level for the 
second Clinton term. But in a post 9/11 world, the military-industrial complex could 
have seen the opportunity to push the US toward “a massive military buildup under the 
cover of the politics created by that crisis and the wars.”132 Under the cover of the terror 
created by the September 11th attacks, the opportunity arose to push for wars which 
would increase the US’s defense spending and the weapons industry’s profits. War 
justifies the massive expansion of the military budget and the subsequent increase of 
defense industry profits in the eyes of the public.  
Like in the Big Oil theory, the arms lobby saw the possibility for lucrative 
profits with the Iraq War, but unlike in the oil theory, the defense industry achieved 
their alleged goal of new record profits. In a war marked by chaos and things not going 
as planned, contractors of all stripes proved to be “the only real winners” and the arms 
industry experienced massive gains.133 The military spending of the US “increased by 
about 70 percent during the presidency of George W. Bush” and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq played a large part in this increase.134 In 2001, the US military 
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budget was $331 billion dollars.135 By the end of the Bush Administration, military 
spending had jumped up to close to $700 billion dollars a year.136 It can be difficult at 
times to assess exactly what spending was due to the war in Iraq, due to the war in 
Afghanistan, or due to the War on Terror more broadly. However, the US clearly spent 
staggering amounts on “new weapons procurement” throughout the War on Terror 
which “totaled over $215 billion from 2004 through 2010.”137 Skyrocketing military 
spending indicates increased profits for the firms receiving the billions of dollars in 
weapons contracts being doled out.  
Top defense contractors clearly benefitted the increasing military spending of 
era in part justified by the Iraq War. Weapons contractors such as “Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and United Technologies” 
experienced an incredible increase in the value of their stocks.138 These large 
contractors in particular “have seen their Pentagon awards nearly double between 
FY2001 and FY2008” and the value of their shares reflected this increase.139 Their 
growth outperformed the stock market at large.140  Daniel Wirls argues that the Global 
War on Terror “was the functional equivalent of a new Cold War insofar as it 
committed the United States politically and economically to an undeclared war to be 
fought by a variety of means around the globe over an indefinite period” and this type 
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of permanent military engagement serves the interests of the arms industry.141 Few 
groups desired the chaotic insurgency and the continual state of war which followed the 
invasion of Iraq, but the arms industry was perfectly content with how the war in Iraq 
has played out as instability rather than successful reconstruction necessitated more 
military spending.142 If the Iraq War ended quickly with a stable democracy in place, it 
wouldn’t serve to justify further spending on weaponry. Permanent engagement and 
simmering conflict in Iraq help justify the growth of military budgets and profits for the 
industry in pursuit of the elusive goal of winning in Iraq. The arms lobby is generally 
incentivized to prefer a general wartime state which serves to justify and enable a 
constantly increasing military budget as seen in the Bush years. The arms industry stood 
to benefit from the invasion of Iraq before the war and they have experienced lucrative 
profits in part due to arming the US military in its Middle Eastern excursions, but it 
remains unclear if the Iraq War was absolutely necessary to justify this novel level of 
spending. 
Influencing Policymakers 
The arms lobby like the Israel lobby or any other special interest group engages 
in a few strategies to influence policymakers toward their policy preferences. 
“Revolving door culture” embeds individuals with strong connections, even conflicts of 
interests, to the defense sector within the executive branch where they can help define 
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national security policy.143 Mearsheimer and Walt describe a system of carrots and 
sticks with which the Israel lobby rewards and punishes legislators and incentivizes 
them to support Israel in Congress to avoid electoral consequences.144 However, the 
Israel Lobby as Mearsheimer and Walt describe acts with a degree of cohesion that the 
arms lobby cannot match as different defense firms’ interests often come in conflict 
with each other. Through these means, the arms industry exercises a great deal of 
influence over the foreign policy decision making process in the US. 
The “revolving door” describes the “movement of government officials into 
positions with the very corporations they had been involved in regulating and steering 
millions or even billions of dollars to during their period of government service.”145 
Some aspects of the conflicts of interests of the Bush Administration have been well 
documented, but few of these discussions capture the extent to which individuals with 
strong connections to the arms industry pervaded the Defense Department as “32 
members of the Bush Administration worked for weapons contractors before taking 
office.”146 These individuals often carried not just their experience and connections in 
the defense industry, but some maintained financial connections to their former firms.147 
One cannot help but think these connections biased decision makers toward decisions 
like the one to invade Iraq which benefitted these corporations.148 The Defense Policy 
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Board, a group created by the Bush Administration to advise the Pentagon, had nine 
members with ties to the Defense Industry, four of whom were registered lobbyists.149 
Vice President Cheney’s connection to Haliburton is well known, but his wife, Lynne, 
“served on Lockheed’s board of directors from 1994 until January 2001, accumulating 
more than $500,000 in deferred director’s fees in the process.”150 Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, two prominent 
proponents of the war, both did paid consulting and advising work for Northrop 
Grumman.151 Beyond these high profile, names who are often credited with being 
among the driving forces for the invasion of Iraq, “former executives, consultants or 
shareholders of top U.S. defense companies” filled out the Bush Administration’s 
national security apparatus and could have used their newfound political positions to 
push for policies which would benefit their former companies in the defense 
sector.152  “Secretary of the Air Force James Roche,” for example, served as an 
executive for Northrup Grumman for over fifteen years before accepting his position 
with the Bush Administration.153 Peter Teets, Undersecretary of the Air Force and 
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, spent decades working for Lockheed 
Martin and its pre-merger predecessor, Martin Marietta, including a stint as its president 
and CEO right before moving into the Bush Administration in 2001.154 The Bush 
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Administration drew heavily upon the defense industry for candidates for positions 
within the Defense Department. 
The arms lobby influences American legislators in the same way any American 
special interest group does. “In America, corruption takes on a more nuanced form than 
it does elsewhere” as interest groups purchase influence in the Capitol through 
campaign contributions and lobbying.155 Interest groups reward politicians with 
campaign contributions if they support the group’s interests. If a politician works 
against the interest group by trying to reduce military spending for example, the interest 
group can punish them by funding a challenger in the next election. In the early 2000s, 
the arms industry contributed “more than $7 million each election cycle to 
Congressional campaigns.”156 To put the lobbying efforts of the defense industry in 
context with the Israel lobby, “Northrop Grumman alone spends seven times as much 
money in its lobbying efforts annually than does AIPAC and Lockheed Martin 
outspends AIPAC by a factor of four.”157 Mearsheimer and Walt describe the Israel 
lobby having an “unmatched ability to play this game of interest-group politics,” but by 
the numbers, that lobby wielded less influence than the defense industry in pure terms 
of spending money on lobbying.158 Like any other interest group, the arms lobby pushes 
legislators toward their preferred policies which includes wars like Iraq through a 
system of rewards and punishments.  
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The “initiative to lease 100 aerial refueling tankers from Boeing” at the price of 
$26 billion marks a clear example of industry influencing policy.159 The industry’s 
lobbying of Senator Ted Stevens(R-AK) got the amendment added to the defense 
budget bill and the two Democratic Senators from Boeing’s home state of Washington 
jumped aboard to support the defense industry in their state.160 As the Chairman of the 
Defense Policy Board  “Richard Perle wrote an op-ed praising the Boeing tanker deal 
after the company invested $20 million in Perle’s investment firm” further 
demonstrating how the industry influences policy makers.161 While the addition of a 
particular spending initiative to the defense budget is far from starting a war, this case 
demonstrates how the industry can affect policy. 
Evaluating the Connection between the Arms Lobby and the Iraq War 
The previous two subsections have established two key things. First, the arms 
industry had a motive to push for the invasion of Iraq as it would increase military 
spending and provide the justification for this spending just by its nature of being a war. 
This came to pass as the Iraq War helped drive both the military budget and weapons 
contractor profits to new highs. Second, the arms lobby held influence over both the 
executive branch through embedding its former members in the Bush Administration 
and the legislative branch through a standard system of lobbying. The arms industry had 
both an incentive to push war in general and the means to influence power toward their 
preferred policy. But no significant evidence exists to show that the arms lobby caused 
                                                        







the war or even pushed for it. The lack of evidence of this connection can be expected 
to an extent as openly revealing this sort of conspiracy to launch a war on behalf of 
corporate interests would damage both the politicians and industries involved. But the 
US system of business influencing policy does not require the explicit dealing one 
associates with corruption. The existence of “an overlapping relationship between the 
boards of directors of the largest seven defense contractors, conservative policy 
planning organizations funded by these contractors, personnel in the Defense 
Department, and high-level cabinet executives within the administration of George W. 
Bush” creates a government which makes decisions to benefit the arms industry without 
needing to make it explicit.162 Based upon similar evidence to the arms lobby theory 
,Mearsheimer and Walt came to the conclusion that the Israel lobby’s “actions were a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for war.”163 A reasonable conclusion may be that 
while not causing the war, the arms lobby can “color the world view of the decision 
makers” and paved the way for the decision to invade Iraq.164  Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, in a 2016 interview described “a 
penchant on behalf of the Congress to bless the use of force more often than not because 
of the constituencies they have and the money they get from the defense contractors.”165 
This marks a distinct example of someone who served in the Bush Administration 
describing the influence of the defense industry on policy in congress. The arms lobby 
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cannot be said to be the definitive cause of the Iraq War or even a cause at all cause, but 
this special interest did clearly exercise influence over the foreign policy decision 
making process and the real policy enacted matches the arms industry’s preference for 
war. The arms lobby’s influence likely biased decision makers in the executive branch 
and legislature in favor of the invasion of Iraq, but the evidence does not show the war 
to have been fought on behalf of this private interest. The arms lobby likely played a 
subtle role in the lead up to the Iraq War by removing barriers like gaining 
Congressional approval for the war. The in-depth study of the arms lobby folk theory 
reveals the argument to be primarily based on the circumstantial connection between the 
Iraq War and increased military spending, but the influence of the arms lobby in subtly 




Reconstruction Contracting and the Cheney-Halliburton Theory 
Many in the public believe the US fought the Iraq War to benefit Vice President 
Cheney’s personal interests. Due to the connection between one of the architects of the 
war, Vice President Cheney, and the company he used to run, Halliburton, which 
happened to be the single highest earning contractor of the war, many speculate the 
Vice President pushed for the invasion for own profit. In more academic terms, the 
theory argues that the sector of “rebuilding and support contractors” which the US 
government brought in to support the military occupation and rebuild Iraqi 
infrastructure after the invasion drove the decision to invade through their connections 
and influence in American politics.166 This section will investigate this theory and the 
influence of the key firms in this sector and their connections to the decision to launch 
the 2003 Iraq War. While the strongest evidence of a connection between the decision 
to invade Iraq and reconstruction contractors proves to clearly be the Cheney-
Halliburton relationship, it is also important to investigate the idea that other 
reconstruction companies also influenced the decision, as possibilities beyond the most 
obvious should not be unnecessarily precluded from consideration. So, first step in this 
process is examining Bechtel, the second most profitable American contractor, and its 
connections to the Bush Administration. Despite its extensive influence, the evidence 
shows Bechtel to be an unlikely culprit as a cause of the Iraq War for a couple of 
reasons.167 After examining Bechtel, this section will turn to Halliburton and show both 
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its lucrative profits from the invasion of Iraq and its connection to one of the key actors 
behind the decision to invade Iraq. This necessitates both an in-depth summary of the 
well-known aspects of the relationship between Vice-President Cheney and Halliburton 
as well as its less well-known elements.  
The invasion of Iraq created the conditions where massive contracts could be 
handed out to rebuild Iraq and support the US occupation, therefore, a little background 
on these conditions is necessary before discussing the evidence about these contractors. 
The state of Iraq immediately after the invasion and in the years that followed should be 
established to better understand the role of firms like Bechtel and Halliburton in Iraq. 
The first Gulf War, over a decade of sanctions, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq devastated 
both key civilian infrastructure and oil production infrastructure, leaving them in 
shambles. Infrastructure would need to be rebuilt to turn Iraq into a model democracy as 
some in the Bush Administration envisioned. Oil production, for example, functioned at 
a fraction of the maximum capacity possible and the already inconsistent access to 
electricity in Iraq become even more unstable. To resolve these issues, US government 
agencies like USAID contracted companies to complete infrastructure projects. 
Additionally, the occupying force in Iraq and the novel Coalition Provisional Authority 
needed support in terms of providing meals, housing, and the countless other tasks 
needed to maintain the occupation . Many authors have written a great deal about what 
life was like in Iraq following the US invasion and they tend to focus on what life was 
like in the Green Zone in Baghdad which was the headquarters of the American 
                                                        





occupation and rebuilding effort.168 The Green Zone like other US military bases could 
be described as “a Halliburton-run city-state” where the Houston based company ran 
most aspects of life and created a miniaturized taste of the US for American soldiers, 
officials, and contractors in the volatile Baghdad.169 Rebuilding Iraq after the invasion 
and supporting the occupying American personnel, civilian and military, created a 
booming industry for American companies. While finding the precise total of contracts 
that went to these firms can be difficult,  “private or publicly listed firms received at 
least $138 billion of U.S. taxpayer money for government contracts for services that 
included providing private security, building infrastructure and feeding the troops” as of 
2013.170 Between 2003 and 2007, “U.S. government agencies obligated a total of $85 
billion for contracts principally performed in the Iraq theater” according to a 
Congressional Budget Office report.171 While that number includes the security 
contractors as well as reconstruction and support contractors, the majority of that total 
went to reconstruction and support contractors.172  
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Investigating a Possible Bechtel Theory 
During the first Gulf War, the US government contracted Bechtel to put out fires 
and restore Kuwaiti oil fields which it accomplished in a relatively effective manner.173 
This previous experience in Iraq made them a likely candidate to receive valuable 
contracts during the second US invasion of Iraq. Bechtel, an engineering and 
construction company, rarely surfaces as a potential private interest cause of the Iraq 
War as Halliburton does, but it was the second largest contractor with the US 
government in the early years of the Iraq War and possessed significant connections to 
the Bush Administration worth considering. Bechtel, while not commonly known itself, 
completed or has been a part of many of the best-known engineering and construction 
feats in the US and globally such as the Hoover Dam and the Channel Tunnel.  
Contracts in Iraq 
Bechtel received lucrative contracts from the US government during the Iraq 
War to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure. These contracts were primarily focused on civilian 
infrastructure as the contract to “Restore Iraqi Oil”(RIO) crucially went to their chief 
competitor, Halliburton.174 In 2003, Bechtel won a contract from USAID to rebuild 
infrastructure that was  “capped at $680 million over 18 months,” though Bechtel would 
go on to earn more than just that initial contract.175 In 2004, Bechtel won a second 
contract from USAID to rebuild Iraqi national infrastructure which would have “a total 
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value of up to $1.8 billion.”176 Bechtel made the decision to pull out of contracting in 
Iraq in 2006, just three years after getting into the Iraq reconstruction business due to a 
number of employees being killed during the insurgency.177 For their time in Iraq, 
Bechtel received “a total of $2.3 billion, a sum that included its undisclosed fee.”178 
While Bechtel made a nice profit in Iraq, the sum appears paltry in comparison to 
Halliburton’s earnings.  
Connections to Government 
Pratap Chatterjee does an excellent job of outlining the extensive connections 
between Bechtel and the Bush Administration which he describes as an “incestuous 
relationship.”179 The revolving door between business and government was ubiquitous 
in the case of Bechtel. President Bush appointed Riley Bechtel, of the Bechtel Family 
and the Chairman of Bechtel, as “a member of President Bush's Export Council to 
advise the government on how to create markets for American companies overseas.”180 
Former Bechtel President and “former secretary of state George Schultz headed up the 
Committee for the Liberation of Iraq” and wrote op-eds urging for the invasion of 
Iraq.181 “Jack Sheehan, a senior vice president at Bechtel” served on the Defense Policy 
Board.182 The list continues as “Daniel Chao, another Bechtel senior vice president,” 
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served on the “advisory board of the US Export-Import Bank.”183 A specific connection 
existed between Bechtel and USAID, the agency which awarded Bechtel its largest 
contracts. Andrew Natsios, the head administrator of USAID while Bechtel was in Iraq, 
had an established relationship with the firm through their work on the “Big Dig” in 
Boston while he served as the Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.184 
While this list of individuals does show a connection between the administration and 
Bechtel, the names and positions which Chatterjee brings up are not in positions 
particularly close to the levers of power. Once upon a time, George Schultz would have 
been of significance, but by the early two thousands, he was far removed from his days 
as president of Bechtel or as Secretary of State. More compelling than just showing the 
connections between Bechtel and government is the evidence of Bechtel making plans 
for Iraq in 2002. On April 21 of that year, “Terry Valenzano, the man who ran Bechtel's 
construction business in Saudi Arabia, flew into Kuwait City to meet with Jay Garner, 
the Pentagon official appointed to oversee Iraq.”185 The Bush Administration selected 
Jay Garner to oversee the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance which 
was intended to govern the reconstruction of Iraq until that plan was scrapped for Paul 
Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority. This meeting shows a direct connection 
between a Bechtel representative and one of the individuals responsible for planning a 
post-war Iraq months before the war would start. Overall, Bechtel like any other 
massive multinational corporation had strong connections to the government and they 
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did receive relatively lucrative contracts in Iraq, but it seems unlikely these connections 
yielded anything more than helping earn their USAID contracts. 
Second to One 
 In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, Bechtel sought the contract to “restore Iraqi 
Oil, or RIO, program,” but according to Sheryl Tappan, a former consultant for Bechtel 
National Marketing & Business Development, it was a non-competitive bidding process 
where Bechtel never had a chance.186 Tappan was “responsible for the proposal that 
won Bechtel the Iraq civil infrastructure reconstruction contract from USAID”, and in 
congressional testimony, she described a non-competitive bidding process for the RIO 
contract.187 She spoke about how the Army Corps of Engineers misled Bechtel, 
neglected to provide information to Bechtel, and generally “ignored our federal laws 
and regulations and the procedures that normally ensure fair play.”188 In another piece 
of congressional testimony, Bunnatine Greenhouse, an Army Corps of Engineers 
whistleblower, confirmed the non-competitive nature of the bidding process for the RIO 
contract.189 She described a process “plagued by conflict of interest” and how the Army 
Corps of Engineers removed her from her position for speaking out about this.190 
Bechtel being pushed out of the bidding process for the lucrative RIO contracts 
indicates that they were not even the most influential firm in the business of receiving 
reconstruction and support contracts. The Department of Defense awarded the “$7 
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billion, sole source, cost plus contract” for the RIO program to Kellogg, Brown, and 
Root (KBR), a subsidiary of Halliburton in a non-competitive bidding process.191 
Bechtel played second fiddle to Halliburton and its subsidiary, KBR, in earning Iraq 
contracts as it was “earning three times as much as Bechtel” or much more in Iraq at 
varying points in time.192 Despite Bechtel’s profits and influence, the conversation 
surrounding reconstruction contractors and the causes of the Iraq War focus on 
Halliburton for good reason as its earnings and influence during the Iraq War outstrips 
any of its rivals making it the clear focus of any theory of support or reconstruction 
contracting as a cause of the Iraq War.  
Halliburton Contracting: A History 
Founded as an oilfield services company in 1919, Halliburton, and its 
subsidiaries such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root, have done big business selling 
everything needed to extract and transport petroleum along with a number of other 
services. While some aspects of the history between Dick Cheney and Halliburton are 
well known, others are not. To fully understand Halliburton’s contracting in Iraq, one 
needs to look back farther than the start of the second Bush Presidency or even 
Cheney’s time running Halliburton. As the Secretary of Defense under George H.W. 
Bush, Dick Cheney commissioned “a $3.9 million strategy for providing rapid support 
to twenty thousand troops in emergency situations” from Halliburton.193 The Defense 
Department ordered “$5 million to do a follow up study” from Halliburton on the 
                                                        
191 Greenhouse. 





prospects of outsourcing the support of American troops around the world.194 These 
studies resulted in the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP 
outsourced the duty of running the key aspects of day-to-day life in the US military 
abroad to corporations. It included everything from doing laundry to supplying fuel to 
providing meals for US soldiers at bases around the world. In 1992, “Halliburton was 
selected by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to implement the plan that it had drawn 
up” and it received the first LOGCAP contract and went onto provide support to the US 
military in the Balkans in the 90s.195 After George H.W. Bush lost in the election in 
1992 and “the obligatory year outside the government-industrial complex,” Dick 
Cheney became the CEO of the company which had been the beneficiary of his efforts 
to outsource support functions as the Secretary of Defense.196 This epitomizes the 
revolving door where government officials move “into positions with the very 
corporations they had been involved in regulating and steering millions or even billions 
of dollars to during their period of government service.”197 Cheney, while in office, 
collaborated with Halliburton to design a program for outsourcing military support 
functions and then, Halliburton promptly won the contract for the program it designed 
and start reaping profits from supporting the US military abroad. But the jump from the 
Department of Defense to Halliburton would not be Cheney’s last time through the 
revolving door. 









Halliburton in Iraq 
While as always, the numbers differ a bit on what exactly Halliburton earned 
from its contracts in Iraq, it clearly made a killing. Halliburton received at least “$39.5 
Billion In Iraq-Related Contracts” as of 2013.198 To put that number in context, some 
worried about the conflict of interest between Cheney and Halliburton before the war 
when it was believed Halliburton could receive “the estimated $1.5 billion in contracts 
to rebuild the oil industry.”199 That initial estimate pales in comparison to the total from 
the entire war or even just the specific contract to Restore Iraqi Oil.200 Halliburton via 
KBR became “the largest Pentagon contractor in Iraq” through the seemingly 
preferential treatment of the Department of Defense whereas Bechtel lost out in unfair 
bidding processes.201 Halliburton through its subsidiary KBR clearly operated on 
another scale as compared to their competitors.202 Beyond the no-bid or non-
competitive nature of Halliburton receiving contracts, the “Cost-plus-award-fee” nature 
of many of their contracts proved to be problematic as it incentivized waste and 
inefficiency.203 In a cost-plus contract, the government pays the contractors for all of its 
costs plus a fee of a couple percent to ensure the company profits. Under this type of 
contract, “the company does not care how much it spends, because under its contracts, 
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the military pays Haliburton for costs plus a small profit margin” of 1 or 2 percent 
depending on the exact contract.204 Cost-plus contracts result in inefficiency, waste, and 
fraud as the cost-plus model incentivizes companies to spend as much as possible to 
increase the profit amount they receive as the percent fee. Chatterjee puts it simply, “the 
more money the company spends, the more profit it can make,” which undermines any 
argument about the efficiency of outsourcing to corporations like Halliburton.205 In 
testimony before Congress, Henry Bunting, a former Halliburton contractor, stated that 
his superiors would often say “don’t worry about price, it’s cost plus.”206 Chatterjee’s 
account of the Green Zone in Baghdad confirms this attitude as he chronicled examples 
of Halliburton contractors ordering expensive embroidered towels and driving empty 
trucks back and forth to rack up higher costs and higher profits.207  
The LOGCAP program which Cheney and Halliburton pioneered became the 
firm’s single biggest contract in Iraq and followed the cost-plus model. In 2001, the 
LOGCAP III contract was awarded to Kellogg, Brown, and Root. Between the start of 
the war in 2003 and the end of the contract in 2007, the army dedicated “$22 billion to 
the LOGCAP contract for services rendered in the Iraq theater” by KBR.208 LOGCAP 
and the RIO contract were the two single biggest contracts received by KBR in Iraq, but 
they also received a number of smaller contracts in Iraq. Due to  their massive 
“contracts to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure and provide logistical support to U.S. 
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troops in Iraq,” Halliburton’s profits grew exponentially from 2002 to 2006.209 
Halliburton’s value reflected the success of its contracting in Iraq as “the company’s 
stock price rose from $10 before the war in Iraq to $41 three years later.”210 In 2007, 
Halliburton, facing increased scrutiny for its work in Iraq and connections to the Bush 
Administration, sold Kellogg, Brown, and Root for a gain of “$933 million” at the peak 
of its value.211 One could speculate this sale came at the height of the subsidiary’s value 
and before an election year that could shake up the White House and potentially cut off 
the firm’s earnings. While it can be difficult to track and calculate Halliburton’s profits 
from Iraq, the war is clearly “the single most profitable event in Haliburton’s 
history.”212 As the largest contractor of the war, Halliburton made massive profits that 
would not have been possible without the invasion of Iraq.  
The Cheney Connection 
The connection between Dick Cheney and Halliburton became well publicized 
and widely believed to be a conflict of interests. This subsection will show what 
connections existed between the Vice President and Halliburton throughout his tenure 
in the White House. Cheney consistently claimed he had “no financial ties to 
Halliburton” while in office, but the evidence suggests otherwise.213 After joining the 
Bush ticket in the 2000 election, Cheney negotiated an early “retirement package, 
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including stock and options, worth millions more than if he had simply resigned.”214 
The least significant aspect of this financial connection was the deferred salary paid to 
Cheney. The number varies a bit depending on the source reporting this salary, but 
Cheney received, roughly, a “deferred compensation of $147,579 in 2001 and $162,392 
in 2002, with payments scheduled to continue for three more years.”215 This salary was 
only slightly less than the salary for being Vice-President. More significantly, Cheney 
kept “189,000 Halliburton shares and 500,000 unvested options even as he entered the 
vice presidency.”216 As previously discussed, when the Halliburton stock price jumped 
from “$10 before the war in Iraq to $41 three years later,” Cheney stood to profit from 
his significant holdings in Halliburton stock.217 According to a report by the 
Congressional Research Service, these connections constituted “continuing financial 
interests in the Halliburton Co.” despite Cheney’s claims to the contrary.218  
 Vice President Cheney played a key role in making the decision to invade Iraq. 
Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld are widely considered “the most prominent backers 
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq” inside of the Bush Administration.219 It is certainly 
concerning that one of the individuals who played “a decisive role in driving the United 
States to invade Iraq” stood to profit from that decision.220 KBR and Halliburton’s 
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profits from Iraq resulted “directly from Cheney’s steering the country into war with 
Iraq.”221 The public discusses this connection frequently due to the conflict of interest 
of one of the chief decision makers behind the war who also held a significant financial 
stake in one of the companies which would go on to profit the most from the war by 
receiving no-bid contracts which do indicate a level of corruption by themselves. 
However, some ascribe Cheney’s interest in the invasion of Iraq to a desire to reassert 
American primacy or to a broader privatization agenda which subsumes individual 
private interests.222 Additionally, no smoking gun proves Cheney’s decision to push for 
the invasion of Iraq stemmed from his personal interest in accumulating wealth or 
aiding his former company.  
No definitive evidence exists to prove this theory beyond a doubt; however, 
some evidence shows that Cheney possibly played a role in ensuring Halliburton 
received the RIO contract. A Defense Department email obtained by the Time 
Magazine from March 5th, 2003 showed that Pentagon “‘action’ on a multibillion-
dollar Halliburton contract was ‘coordinated’ with Cheney's office.”223 The email 
directly links Cheney’s office with the non-competitive bidding process in which 
Halliburton won the RIO contract. While the evidence of this is just a single email with 
vague language, it certainly indicates Cheney utilized his position in power to benefit 
his former company. Despite not proving that Cheney’s personal interests to be a cause 
of the war, it reveals that he did undertake actions while in office to benefit Halliburton 
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and therefore, himself. Cheney not only had significant financial interests in 
Halliburton, but some evidence exists of the Vice President using his position to aid 
Halliburton. As a possible counterpoint, the Cheney-Halliburton theory relies on just 
one actor and their interests which weakens the theory regardless of the importance of 
that one actor. The theory would be more convincing if other significant members of the 
Bush Administration also possessed close connections to Halliburton.224 Regardless, an 
undeniable connection existed between one of the primary architects of the Iraq War 
and one of the companies that benefited the most from the war.  
Before concluding, the recurring theme of the Bush Administration and 
Cheney’s opacity and unwillingness to take action to dispel the concerns of critics 
should be briefly addressed. If Vice President Cheney wanted to truly demonstrate his 
lack of financial interests in Halliburton and subsidiaries, a complete and crystal clear 
divestment from Halliburton before taking office would mark a concrete action to dispel 
public concerns. Cheney “refused to answer a request from Democrats in Congress that 
he provide an accounting of any communications he and his staff have had with 
Halliburton or actions they have taken on Halliburton contracts,” but if he truly had not 
taken any actions to benefit Halliburton, he could have revealed these 
communications.225 The secrecy of Cheney in relation to his private interests invites 
suspicion as he clearly could have taken actions to be transparent and prove that he was 
not acting on behalf of a private interest. 
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Evaluating the Cheney-Halliburton Theory 
The folk theory which connects Vice President Cheney and his relationship with 
Halliburton to the origins of the Iraq War is popular and widely believed. Unlike some 
popular folk theories, the facts justify the public’s suspicion and allegations of 
conspiracy. Before investigating the Halliburton theory, this section examined Bechtel, 
one of Halliburton’s competitors. Like many other large US companies, Bechtel had 
significant connections to the government and profited from the invasion and 
reconstruction of Iraq, but no evidence indicates Bechtel played a key or even minor 
role in causing the invasion of Iraq. The evidence supporting the Halliburton folk theory 
is relatively straightforward. Halliburton received billions of dollars in government 
contracts in Iraq. Vice President Cheney, one of the chief architects of the war, used to 
be the CEO of Halliburton and maintained a significant financial connection to the 
company during his time in office through deferred salary and stock options. One of the 
key actors behind the war in Iraq stood to financially benefit from the invasion and 
reconstruction of Iraq. Additionally, Halliburton appeared to have received many of its 
contracts without fair competition and some evidence points toward Cheney ensuring 
his former company received the most valuable Pentagon contracts.  
It cannot be definitively said whether Cheney operated purely to benefit his 
personal interest and as a representative of a private interest, but the evidence shows the 
Vice President and his former company benefited from his decision making. Despite the 
lack of concrete proof, the conflict of interests at play cannot be discounted in 




architects of the Iraq War. While his true motives remain unknowable, Cheney’s 





Neoliberal Ideology, Privatization, and the Invasion of Iraq 
One overarching theme exists throughout many of the theories of private 
interests discussed thus far, a focus on privatization. In some cases, such as that of the 
arms lobby theory, private companies already dominated the production of weapons 
before the start of the Iraq War, but other interests like private military contractors of 
the security, support, and reconstruction varieties all saw massive increases in contracts 
and profits due to the war. This theory put forward by some academics and journalists 
argues that the Iraq War continued the neoliberal movement through enabling the 
further privatization of US and Iraqi state functions.226 Proponents of this theory trace 
the ideological origins of neoliberal economic theory from the Cold War via its 
disciples such as Donald Rumsfeld to the Iraq War which enabled their dream of 
privatizing war. Born as a reaction to the Keynesian economic policy of the New Deal 
and Great Society eras, neoliberalism promises less government regulation and the 
privatization of state functions. According to neoliberal theory, “the avoidance of state 
regulation” leads to intense competition between firms to provide the best goods and 
services for the public and government at the lowest prices.227 First, this section will 
draw a clear line from the birth of the neoliberal movement to the decision to invade 
Iraq. Next, it will show how privatization pervaded every aspect of the American 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. Finally, this section will discuss the necessity of the 
invasion of Iraq to the neoliberal agenda and tackle the challenge of deciphering 
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whether a genuine belief in neoliberal ideology drove the decision to go to war or 
whether it just served as a vehicle for the types of private interests discussed in previous 
sections. Privatization rears its head in any isolated discussion of a single parochial 
interest as the cause the Iraq War and its commonality across and incorporation of 
multiple theories make this theory somewhat compelling despite the issues that arise 
when trying to determine whether ideology or interests drove decision making.228 The 
privatization theory of the Iraq War brings together multiple theories of private interests 
under one banner and shows a comprehensive agenda for privatizing and profiting from 
the military apparatus as a chief goal of the Bush Administration which they largely 
accomplished through the invasion of Iraq.  
The Origins of the Neoliberal Movement: Friedman and Rumsfeld 
Naomi Klein in her book “The Shock Doctrine” places the Iraq War as a new 
zenith of the neoliberal movement whose origins she traces back to the free market 
ideology of Milton Friedman. According to Friedman, neoliberal economics would 
“seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, 
competition among employers to protect workers and owners of property, and 
competition among consumers to protect the enterprises themselves.”229 The neoliberal 
project encouraged the privatization of previously state-run functions to maximize 
efficiency through competition. This theory rose to prominence during the 80s in 
Reagan’s United States and Thatcher’s United Kingdom where previously state run 
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functions like transportation were sold off or outsourced to private firms.230 Klein 
connects the predominant privatization ideology to foreign policy as well as domestic 
policy as she ascribes US foreign interventions like Chile in 1973 to “neoliberal 
geopolitics” which mandate the privatization of state industries on a global scale.231 
Neither coal mines in Britain nor copper mines in Chile can be publicly owned under 
the global neoliberal order.  These early days of neoliberalism start to demonstrate the 
“relationship between US military policy and neoliberal economic ideology” which 
would reach new heights with the Iraq War according to Klein.232 But as this section 
will show, the disciples of Friedman who made the decision to invade Iraq would take 
neoliberal foreign policy further than ever before.  
Donald Rumsfeld had “a particularly close connection with Milton Friedman” 
and Friedman’s neoliberal ideology greatly influenced his beliefs.233 Rumsfeld attended 
Friedman’s lectures at the University of Chicago and praised Friedman throughout his 
career.234 Reciprocally, Friedman approved of Rumsfeld’s politics and thought of 
Rumsfeld as one the best and most ferocious warriors for his free market ideology. 
Friedman reportedly urged Reagan to select Rumsfeld to be his Vice President and 
“called choosing Bush over Rumsfeld the worst decision of Reagan’s presidency.”235 
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After leaving his first stint as the Secretary of Defense under President Ford, Rumsfeld 
launched a successful career in the private sector, and he maintained his strong belief in 
the privatization of government functions into his next government job in the second 
Bush Administration.  
Having returned to the position of the Secretary of Defense now under George 
W. Bush, Rumsfeld announced a bold new agenda to streamline and cut the costs of the 
US military through privatization and outsourcing. On September 10th of 2001, 
Rumsfeld made a speech declaring war upon the Pentagon bureaucracy by comparing it 
to Soviet style, inefficient centralized planning.236 He asserted that the Department 
would be scoured for “functions that could be performed better and more cheaply 
through commercial outsourcing.”237 In this speech, Rumsfeld described his novel 
vision for how the US military could be run more like a nimble and efficient business 
through contracting out many of its functions to private firms. This speech despite its 
massive implications and aggressive assault of the Pentagon bureaucracy itself as 
essentially un-American would go largely overlooked due to the terrorist attacks which 
occurred the very next day. In a 2002 article in Foreign Affairs, Rumsfeld reiterated his 
call for a “a revolution in military affairs” to transform the US military into Rumsfeld’s 
vision for a 21st century military which relies heavily upon contracting.238 Rumsfeld 
wanted a military and Defense Department where individuals would “behave less like 
bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists.”239 Decades after Rumsfeld first became 
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an adherent of Friedman’s neoliberal ideology, he launched the project “of applying 
‘market logic’ to the US military” through privatizing or outsourcing all but the core, 
warfighting functions of the military.240 On September 10th of 2001, Rumsfeld, 
however, didn’t have a great deal of optimism about succeeding in this task as he stated, 
“We will not complete this work. In one year or five years. Or even eight years. An 
institution built with trillions of dollars over decades of time does not turn on a 
dime.”241 But Rumsfeld’s pessimism about the chances of largely privatizing the US 
military during his tenure as the Secretary of Defense proved to be unwarranted as the 
Iraq War allowed for a rapid privatization of military functions. 
Unlike Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, another one of the key architects 
behind the Iraq War, lacks the clear ideological connection to the neoliberal movement. 
Cheney got his start as “a protégé of Rumsfeld’s in the Ford administration” and it can 
be reasonably asserted that the driving economic ideology of his mentor likely 
influenced Cheney’s beliefs.242 The decisions Cheney made throughout his career 
generally fall in line with neoliberal ideology despite the typically cagey Cheney not 
making his beliefs clear to the entire world. The creation of the “Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)” as engineered by Secretary of Defense Cheney in 
the first Bush Administration which outsourced the basic support functions necessary to 
maintain the US military’s presence abroad to private corporations fits perfectly with 
Rumsfeld’s goal of privatizing the military. Rumsfeld claimed that privatization would 
make the US military more streamlined, efficient, and cheaper for the taxpayer which 
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seems like a reasonable goal, but in reality, the military budget skyrocketed during 
Rumsfeld’s second tenure as the Defense Secretary. In fact, even before the 9/11 attacks 
that launched the Global War on Terror or declaring a war on the bureaucracy, 
Rumsfeld “had just asked Congress for an 11 percent budget increase.”243 The US 
military’s contractors would quickly become known for the exact opposite of the 
efficiency promised by Rumsfeld as contractors throughout the early years of the Iraq 
War would be mired by corruption and waste scandals of varying scales. The non-
competitive nature of the bidding process for massive contracts in Iraq indicates that the 
Bush Administration did not even make a genuine effort to maximize efficiency through 
privatization as it relies on multiples bidders and fair competition.244 Some ascribe the 
“enthusiasm for further privatizing national security” found in the Bush Administration 
to “commercial concerns and lobbying,” but these cannot be easily distinguished from 
the ideological beliefs of decision makers.245 The origins of Rumsfeld’s neoliberal 
beliefs can be traced back decades and in the earliest years of the Bush Administration, 
he made it an explicit goal for his tenure. The Iraq War would realize Rumsfeld and 
Friedman’s neoliberal dream as applied to the US military. 
Realizing the Privatization Dream in Iraq 
The Iraq War provided the opportunity for the Bush Administration to apply 
“the corporatist principles of the [neoliberal] counterrevolution” to the fullest extent 
possible in privatizing every function of the military and the new Iraq that could be 
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privatized.246 Before discussing the privatization of US military functions, the 
potentially lucrative market of privatizing previously state-owned businesses in newly 
‘liberated’ Iraq should be briefly discussed. The biggest possible prize in the 
privatization of Iraq was the Iraqi National Oil Corporation.247 After invading Iraq and 
toppling Saddam Hussein, “U.S. and British officials have pushed legislation that would 
effectively privatize Iraqi oil production,” but they failed in those efforts as Iraq fell into 
chaos.248 In the context of the anti-American insurgency and the struggle against the 
privatization of Iraqi oil by the workers in the industry, the Iraqi people forced the US 
to abandon its plans for the privatization of Iraqi oil despite the US’s desire to open it 
up to foreign domination.249 While the privatization effort by the US and its Coalition 
Provisional Authority failed with oil, they succeeded everywhere else in Iraq. “The 
widespread privatization of public enterprises, which combined with allowing for 100% 
foreign ownership of Iraqi companies” made the Iraqi economy a lucrative opportunity 
to profit as the neoliberal movement spread by force to the previously state dominated 
and isolated Iraq.250  
Under Rumsfeld, “the US undertook a deliberate policy of military privatization 
and deregulation in Iraq” where the US military privatized or outsourced previously 
state run military functions .251 In 2007, “an internal Department of Defense census on 
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the industry found almost 160,000 private contractors were employed in Iraq.”252 
During the occupation of Iraq, the number of private contractors surpassed the number 
of US military personnel, marking an enormous shift toward the private sector in US 
military operations.253 As of 2013, “private or publicly listed firms received at least 
$138 billion of U.S. taxpayer money for government contracts for services that included 
providing private security, building infrastructure and feeding the troops.”254 These 
contractors can be broadly divided between “rebuilding and support contractors” and 
“private security contractors.”255 Rebuilding, reconstruction, and support contractors 
received government contracts to complete various infrastructure projects in Iraq and 
provide support for the military occupation as discussed in the previous section on 
reconstruction contractors. Private security contractors conducted security operations 
such as guarding important personnel from the State Department or infrastructure 
projects. These industries received billions of dollars in government contracts following 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq to conduct tasks that had been previously handled by the 
military itself.  
Privatizing Reconstruction 
Reconstruction and support contracting experienced a massive boom due the 
behemoth task of rebuilding the devastated country of Iraq and “the sheer scale 
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involved in supporting 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and surrounding nations.”256 The 
Iraq War brought the LOGCAP program of outsourcing the support of US military 
operations to new heights from its origins in Cheney’s Department of Defense in the 
early nineties and its first test in the Balkans. As the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney 
worked with Halliburton to develop the LOGCAP to privatize the support functions 
necessary to maintain an overseas military presence.257 The US military when abroad 
needs food, laundry, housing, and countless other relatively mundane services provided 
and historically, these had been handled by the military itself. “From 2003 through 
2007, the Army obligated more than $22 billion to the LOGCAP contract” which 
Kellogg, Brown, and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton had received.258 It would 
eventually have “a cumulative value of $35.7 billion.”259 LOGCAP was the single 
biggest reconstruction or support contract in Iraq, and it marks the distinct privatization 
of a previously government run function. Despite the cost-savings promised by 
neoliberalism, the Congressional Budget Office “determined that Army support units 
could perform LOGCAP tasks during wartime for virtually the same costs as 
contractors.”260 During his time in Iraq as a journalist, Pratap Chatterjee recorded 
countless instances of waste and inefficiency from private reconstruction contractors as 
their cost-plus contracting model encouraged them to spend as much as possible.261 
While private security contractors did earn billions, reconstruction and support 
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contractors received the vast majority of the “at least $138 billion” spent on military 
contracting in Iraq.262   
Private Security Contractors 
Private security contractors flooded into Iraq in the years following the initial 
invasion for contracts to provide security for various officials and projects. Most of 
these contractors were former members of various militaries who turned to the lucrative 
field of security contracting after leaving the armed forces. Companies like Blackwater 
and DynCorp paid their employees upwards of a thousand dollars a day for conducting 
security activities in Iraq.263 While the industry did exist before the Iraq War, this war 
put the private security industry on the map and made Blackwater, the biggest and most 
infamous private contractor, a household name. After the start of the Iraq War and the 
insurgency which gave the US military fits in trying to control cities like Fallujah, 
Blackwater’s business exploded. The US government increasingly relied on private 
security contractors to protect officials like the head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, Paul Bremer, and infrastructure. George Jackson, a Blackwater Executive, 
claimed that Blackwater had experienced growth of “300%” in a relatively short 
period.264 It can be difficult to assess the exact value of the contracts Blackwater 
received from the government as much of that information was not entirely public in the 
cases where Blackwater received contracts from the CIA and other less public 
organizations. However, Blackwater received close to 500 million dollars for its work 
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for the State Department from 2004 to 2006.265 The private security industry thrived in 
the failures of the US to quickly establish a stable state after the invasion of Iraq. The 
insurgency, combined with a desire to keep uniformed troop levels low, created a need 
for private security personnel to conduct functions such as guarding officials and 
protecting convoys going from where the US’s occupation was run in the Green Zone to 
the Baghdad airport.266 Blackwater wasn’t the only private security contractor that won 
big in Iraq as DynCorp which dabbled in both support and security contracting received 
and mismanaged a “$1.2bn contract for training Iraqi police.”267 The Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that “total spending by U.S. agencies and U.S.-funded 
contractors for private security services ranged between $6 billion and $10 billion over 
the 2003–2007 period.”268 Instead of relying on uniformed troops and government 
employees, contractors allowed the Bush Administration “to sell a politically viable war 
policy to domestic audiences by maintaining low levels of uniformed troop level.”269 
Contractors kept the official troop level relatively low despite the situation in Iraq’s 
rapid deterioration. Like other forms of contracting, the Bush Administration presented 
private security contractors as a cost saving and efficient market-based solution as 
neoliberal theory encourages, but hiring security contractors proved to be roughly 
equivalent in costs to using military personnel according to the Congressional Budget 
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Office.270 Private security contracting became a lucrative industry due to the war in 
Iraq, while yielding few benefits for taxpayers and leading to the well-publicized 
problematic conduct of private security contractors in Iraq. While not quite active 
combat, the privatization of security functions marks a step toward Rumsfeld’s vision of 
privatizing warfare as it further reduced the role of government in war in favor private 
enterprises.  
Connecting Neoliberalism and the Decision to Invade Iraq 
During Rumsfeld’s time as Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration, the 
role of private contractors experienced extreme growth as contractors took on a massive 
role in post-invasion Iraq. In the September 10th, 2001 speech where Rumsfeld outlined 
his plan for future of the military, he seemed to think that privatization and transforming 
the military to fit the neoliberal vision would take years to accomplish. At this point, 
Rumsfeld clearly had a goal to “shrink the role of government and expand the role of 
the private sector, especially in the realm of America’s war-making ability,” but 
Rumsfeld stated this task would be accomplished slowly over the years.271 One would 
expect that radically transforming a massive and entrenched organization like the US 
military to be a long and arduous process. However, through what Klein describes as 
the power of “shock,” privatization occurred at a rapid rate.272 After 9/11, the War in 
Afghanistan, and the Iraq War, the US military radically shifted toward private 
contracting. The shock of the invasion of Iraq created the opportunity not just for the 
remaking of Iraq itself but for the privatization of the invading military as well. For 
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Iraqi industries, the Hussein regime needed to be toppled and its laws erased to open 
them up privatization.273 In peace time or even with just the War on Terror, the 
transformation which incorporated private military contractors into the US military 
would not have been possible.274 The post-invasion project of nation building and 
fighting an insurgency were the tasks that brought in billions of dollars in contracts for 
firms like KBR and Blackwater and made them a central part of the US’s warfighting 
apparatus. The “neoliberal model of defense economics” which shrinks the task of the 
military to just combat operations and contracts everything else out could not have been 
quickly implemented without the Iraq War.275 Simply put, the Iraq War created an 
opportunity for military contractors to swoop in and become an integral part of the US 
military’s overseas presence as envisioned by Rumsfeld. The invasion of Iraq created 
the tasks of occupying and rebuilding Iraq. The decision to invade Iraq manufactured 
the conditions in which contractors could be brought in to handle the unfolding, 
artificial crisis. The Iraq War expanded and cemented some already extant aspects of 
military privatization. For example, LOGCAP II which ran from 1997 to 2001 was 
“worth a total of $102 million.”276 LOGCAP during the Iraq War would be expanded to 
be worth over $20 billion.277 Iraq created an opportunity for Rumsfeld to hand off more 
and more military duties to private contractors. War, disaster, or crisis bring with the 
intense destruction a possibility for radical change. Through the Iraq War, Rumsfeld 
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achieved his vision for a military that heavily relied upon private contractors years 
ahead of schedule. 
Untangling Interests from Ideology 
It can be difficult to discern whether actors like Rumsfeld and Cheney were 
driven by neoliberal ideology or pure, narrow self-interest to make the decision to 
invade Iraq. The overlap between an ideology that emphasizes privatization and acting 
in service of private interests makes the actions from either motivation hard to discern. 
For example, Kellogg, Brown, and Root’s success in Iraq could result from the Bush 
Administration’s genuine belief in privatization or it could just stem from Vice 
President Cheney’s narrow interests in the company. Klein argues that these decision 
makers mentally merge the interests of American companies with the good of the US 
overall.278 She claims that Vice President Cheney, under neoliberal ideology, would see 
the interests of Halliburton and the US as the same.279 This idea cannot be proved 
definitively as neoliberal ideology and the private interests of those behind the war 
remain entangled. One indication toward the influence of private interests being a 
stronger factor than neoliberal ideology is the failure to establish something resembling 
“the competitive order” envisioned by Friedman.280 Kellogg, Brown, and Root won 
non-competitive bidding processes for massive contracts in Iraq, undermining any 
possibility for the efficiency driving competition promised by neoliberal theory.281 
While this offers some evidence in favor of private interests as being the true cause of 
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the war rather than ideology, the two remain deeply intertwined and hard to separate. 
Different actors likely had different motives as Rumsfeld was a more prominent 
proponent of neoliberalism for example, while Cheney seems to fit the model of 
someone pursuing their narrow interests. Neoliberalism likely had some effect, but the 
material actions of the Bush Administration did not reflect the pursuit of efficiency 
through competition.  
The Neoliberalism Narrative 
Klein’s popular theory presents a satisfying explanation for the Iraq War which 
places it into a larger narrative of the ideological project of neoliberalism. The theory 
begins with the origins of the neoliberal movement during the Cold War where Donald 
Rumsfeld became a fervent supporter of Milton Friedman’s project. The narrative then 
jumps to Rumsfeld’s clear intent in earliest stages of the Bush Administration to 
privatize large aspects of US military, a task he saw as likely to span multiple 
administrations. But due to the Iraq War, as managed by Cheney and Rumsfeld, this 
neoliberal dream could be realized years ahead of schedule due the shock of the Iraq 
War which enabled the rapid and radical transformation of the US’s warfighting 
apparatus to one that hands outs billions in contracts to private firms each year. The Iraq 
War provided the necessary shock and opportunity to implement Rumsfeld’s vision for 
the US military according to proponents of this theory like Naomi Klein. The neoliberal 
narrative tells a satisfying story with clear historical origins that result in the Iraq War. 
This narrative has made this theory popular, but an honest review of the evidence raises 
a few complications. First, while the logic behind the theory of ‘shock’ makes sense, it 




crisis of the 9/11 Attacks and the Afghanistan War already fueled the privatization of 
the US military. A second complication to this theory is the lack of evidence of a good 
faith implementation of free market competition to maximize efficiency as prescribed 
by neoliberal economics. The reality shows that, in the case of at least some major 
contracts in Iraq, nothing resembling a free-market competition existed and outsourcing 
seemed to be means of benefiting private companies rather than serving the public 
good. Klein argues that for neoliberals like Rumsfeld the national interest and private 
interests are one and the same, but one cannot assess the mindset of Rumsfeld or other 
decisionmakers with certainty. However, the evidence indicates neoliberalism served as 
a vessel for handing out large contracts to well connected firms rather than an ideology 
followed for the good of the American people. Despite these complications, Klein’s 
theory presents a perhaps uniquely satisfying narrative that tells a compelling story 
which cannot be entirely discounted, despite the evidence showing private interests to 




Conclusion: Fact or Folk? 
After reviewing these different theories of private interests as the cause of the 
Iraq War, a few things can be said definitively about the role of private interests. First, 
many private interests before the Iraq War saw the potential for enormous profits in an 
Iraq free of Saddam Hussein and many private interests earnt massive profits in Iraq, 
primarily through government contracts. Second, these private interests wielded 
immense political power both over the legislature and, most importantly, within the 
Bush Administration. Through the revolving door, private interests embedded different 
actors with strong lingering connections to the private interests which stood to profit 
from the war. In the cases of some theories of private interests, the evidence reveals a 
level of collaboration and planning on Iraq policy between the Bush Administration and 
private interests. Definitive proof that private interests drove the decision to invade Iraq 
does not exist, but these folk theories, for the most part, are not unfounded. The 
intensive review of folk theories indicates that significant evidence does show that 
certain private interests profited greatly from the war and held enough influence to 
likely sway policy makers. By their very nature, definitive proof of these theories 
remains elusive as the theoretical conspirators would go to great lengths to prevent their 
public confirmation as demonstrated by Vice President Cheney’s secretive behavior.  
These theories do not warrant academic dismissal as in the case of the Iraq War, many 
questions marks remain, and these theories of private interests help fill in the gaps. 
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, provides additional 
confirmation of these theories broadly as he stated that “it is now private interests that 




to have influenced the Bush Administration’s decision to use military force in Iraq.282 It 
can be asserted with a reasonable degree of certainty that private interests, along with a 
bevy of other factors, played a role in the decision to invade Iraq in at least some 
capacity, but not all theories of private interests and the invasion of Iraq prove to be 
equally meritorious.  
Reviewing the Big Oil Theory 
Was the Iraq War really ‘Blood for Oil’ as so many claim? The Big Oil theory 
which alleges the United States fought the war on behalf of oil companies to gain 
control over Iraqi petroleum reserves, while widely believed in the public, has been 
ritually ignored or quickly dismissed by academics. However, some do concede that it 
is “easy to reach the conclusion that the Bush administration’s primary motive was to 
gain control over the Iraqi oil industry and to parcel it out to American energy firms.”283 
The public makes a connection between Iraqi petroleum, profit hungry oil companies, 
and a Bush Administration with strong connections to and instances of cooperation with 
Big Oil. A few academics refute this folk theory by pointing out lifting sanctions as an 
alternative and easier method of accessing Iraqi oil and that the invasion of Iraq did not 
yield massive profits as the theory would predict. But a careful study of the 
circumstances can make these refutations far from the final word on the subject. 
Changing circumstances and the possibility of privatizing Iraqi oil made invasion a 
uniquely tempting option for oil companies. Before the invasion, the plan seemed to be 
for Ahmed Chalabi to be the new leader of Iraq, for him to “privatize Iraq’s oil”, and 
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then, give Big Oil control over Iraqi oil production.284 The Bush Administration, Big 
Oil, and Chalabi failed to realize this plan as the people of Iraq resisted the US’s efforts 
to gain control over their oil and as the situation deteriorated due to the insurgency, the 
plan fell apart. The glimpses available of Vice President Cheney’s secretive Energy 
Task Force provide the most compelling evidence for this theory. The evidence shows 
the Vice President, one of the key forces behind the decision to invade Iraq, meeting 
with members of the oil industry and reviewing existing Iraqi oil contracts which 
notably went to French and Russian companies.285 A leaked memo even reveals a level 
of collaboration between this Task Force and the National Security Council.286 These 
leaked documents show a distinct relationship between the Bush Administration and the 
oil industry on Iraq policy regardless of the many gaps in our knowledge due to their 
secretive nature. Despite the academic dismissal of this theory, the public’s general 
suspicion and belief that the war was fought on behalf of Big Oil proves to be relatively 
well founded. While it cannot be definitively proven what role the oil industry played in 
causing the war, Big Oil almost certainly played a role in pushing the US to invade Iraq. 
Reviewing the Arms Lobby Theory 
Many in the public believe the folk theory that the United States fought the Iraq 
War on behalf of the arms industry or due to the military-industrial complex. The theory 
argues that the powerful industry influenced the Bush Administration to invade Iraq to 
maximize their profits from selling weaponry to the US government. What supports this 
theory is the massive increase in military spending during the Bush years which led to 
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greater profits for well connected firms like Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman. 
However, finding a precise causal link between the war and the industry proves 
difficult. The industry needed some form of justification for higher military spending 
and a war provides that, but just the threat of an external enemy also serves as a 
justification.287 The military-industrial complex likely preferred a wartime footing as it 
justifies higher military spending, but nothing precisely connects the industry to 
wanting to invade Iraq as the War in Afghanistan and the War on Terror already 
justified military spending in the eyes of the public. The arms lobby exerted a fair 
amount of influence over US policy through lobbying and the revolving door, but their 
influence did not quite reach the top level of the Bush Administration in the way that 
some other private interests do. No evidence directly connects the arms lobby with the 
decision to invade, but proponents of this theory would argue that the military-industrial 
complex’s nature makes that type of explicit connection unnecessary. But overall, 
despite its popularity, the arms lobby theory of private interests proves to be 
unconvincing as a cause of the Iraq War. The most that can be said is that the arms 
lobby’s influence generally clears the way for and encourages war generally, but little 
evidence connects this particular interest to the Iraq War specifically.  
Reviewing the Cheney-Halliburton Theory 
During the Bush Administration, the public and the media dedicated a 
tremendous amount of coverage to the connection between the highest earning 
contractor of the Iraq War, Halliburton, and its former CEO, Vice President Cheney. 
                                                        




This section evaluated the theory that the Cheney-Halliburton connection led to the war 
as well as the theory that reconstruction contractors at large played a role in the decision 
to invade Iraq. First, this section examined Bechtel, the second most profitable 
reconstruction and support contractor in Iraq. While Bechtel had some interesting 
connections to the Bush Administrations, they failed to secure the biggest contracts due 
to unfair bidding processes and, generally, never possessed the influence necessary to 
be a driving force behind the war in Iraq. Halliburton, on the other hand, proves to be a 
different story as the firm earned close $40 billion in contracts and received many of 
them through non-competitive bidding processes like the one for the lucrative RIO 
contract.288 Vice President Cheney as the former CEO of Halliburton maintained a 
financial interest in Halliburton during his time in office through deferred salary and 
stock options. As proponents of this popular theory quickly point out, this maintained 
connection demonstrates that one of the chief decision makers behind the war possessed 
a direct financial interest in and profited from the invasion of Iraq. The most compelling 
piece of evidence that shows this conflict of interest in action comes in the form of a 
leaked memo revealing that Cheney’s office at least partially coordinated the non-
competitive RIO bidding process which led to the $7 billion contract going to 
Halliburton.289 While this example does not confirm that Cheney pushed for the war for 
personal gain, it demonstrates Cheney’s willingness to use his position for personal gain 
and profit of his former company. In the public discourse surrounding the Iraq War, 
many have seen the connection between Vice President Cheney and Halliburton as 
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definitive proof of the Iraq War being launched on behalf of private interests. The 
popularity of this theory proves to be reasonable despite the folk theory rarely delving 
into all the minutiae. Definitive proof of Cheney’s motives does not exist, and he can be 
shown to have had significant ideological motivations such as the pursuit of primacy, 
but his personal, private interest in the war cannot be discounted.290 It remains 
unknowable exactly what went on in Cheney’s head as he pushed for the decision to 
invade Iraq, but it can definitively be said he stood to profit from the decision. The 
Halliburton-Cheney theory shows the most precise connection out of any theory 
between a private interest which benefitted from the war and the decision to invade, and 
thus, this theory proves to be relatively convincing and should not be ignored as a 
significant factor in the decision-making process that led to the invasion. 
Reviewing the Neoliberalism Theory 
Naomi Klein’s theory of the Iraq War that she puts forward in The Shock 
Doctrine combines multiple theories of private interests under the banner of neoliberal 
ideology. She discusses and unites multiple private interests such as the various forms 
of military contractors and oil companies under the general banner of the movement 
toward privatizing and outsourcing government functions. The theory weaves a 
historical narrative that finds its origins in the neoliberal movement born during the 
Cold War from Milton Friedman’s economic theories. The theory tracks Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld as an adherent of neoliberal economics, but the influence of 
the Friedmanite belief in privatization existed throughout the Bush Administration. The 
                                                        




Bush Administration and Rumsfeld undertook a monumental project of privatizing and 
outsourcing military functions which resulted in record profits for firms like Halliburton 
and Blackwater. The theory argues that the Iraq War provided the shock or opportunity 
necessary to rapidly make progress on this neoliberal project in the Department of 
Defense. Klein merges this ideological belief in privatization with the type of private 
interests theory primarily discussed in this thesis by arguing that these politicians view 
the interests of American businesses as indistinguishable from the national interest. 
Despite the significant presence of neoliberal ideology in the Bush Administration, the 
real policies of the administration resemble policies implemented to increase profits for 
certain private interests rather than a good faith effort to maximize efficiency and 
benefit American taxpayers as prescribed by Friedman’s work. From Klein’s 
perspective, this fits the general trend of the implementation of privatization policies, 
but it does not fit neoliberal ideology. While Klein’s theory centered around neoliberal 
ideology tells a satisfying story that could help explain the Iraq War, the evidence tends 
to indicate that privatization and outsourcing served as means of benefitting well 
connected corporate interests rather than a genuine ideological motive as demonstrated 
by the Bush Administration’s actions. Neoliberal ideology likely played a role in 
Rumsfeld’s motivations and Klein presents a compelling narrative, but the evidence 
points to private interests rather than neoliberal ideology being more significant force 
behind the outsourcing of military functions. 
Fact or Folk? 
Despite its popularity, the arms lobby theory of the Iraq War fails to provide a 




Administration’s decision to invade Iraq.291 The neoliberal ‘shock’ theory tells an 
interesting story and crafts a satisfying, decades spanning narrative which shows clear 
ideological motives within decision makers as manifesting in the invasion of Iraq, but 
the evidence tends to show that neoliberal ideology tended to serve private interests 
rather than an ideological goal. The Big Oil theory is perhaps the most popular folk 
theory of the origins of the Iraq War, yet academics tend to quickly dismiss it with a 
few logical refutations. As this thesis has shown, these refutations can be complicated 
and even debunked. A fair amount of evidence supports the Big Oil theory as the 
administration and industry had a plan for lucrative profits from a newly privatized Iraqi 
oil industry and Big Oil collaborated with the Bush Administration on Iraq policy to at 
least some degree. No smoking gun exists and much of the administration and 
industry’s communications remain shrouded in secrecy, but some proponents of this 
theory argue that the evidence available is sufficient to declare the Iraq War to have 
been fought for Big Oil despite the lack of damning evidence.292 Due to the lack of 
evidence, a definitive statement cannot be made about the extent of role of Big Oil in 
the decision to invade Iraq, but this parochial interest clearly played some role and this 
theory should not be quickly discounted. A perhaps even more compelling theory is the 
Cheney-Halliburton connection. The chief architect of the war maintaining a financial 
interest in the company that profited the most from the war demands suspicion. Again, 
no definitive evidence shows this private interest motivated Cheney’s push for the 
                                                        
291 While the arms lobby cannot be pinpointed as a proximate cause of the decision to invade Iraq, the 
close study of its policy preferences and significant influence do indicate that enables aggressive wars 
through its general preference for a wartime footing as to justifying spending. A different research project 
could make the argument that the arms lobby subtly pushes for war more broadly despite the lack of 
evidence connecting to it the Iraq case. 




invasion, but it cannot be discounted as significant factor. The arms lobby theory and 
the neoliberal theory bring some interesting ideas to the discussion, but they fail to 
provide the same level of compelling evidence as found in the Big Oil and the Cheney-
Halliburton theories.  
The secretive and conspiratorial nature of these theories makes definitive 
evidence an impossibility unless new information comes to light, but the careful 
examination of these folk theories show they are not the unfounded beliefs academics 
often discount them as. In both the Big Oil theory and the Cheney-Halliburton theory, 
the evidence shows a strong connection between a private interest and the Bush 
Administration’s decision-making process in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq. It can 
be reasonably asserted that private interests did play some role in the decision to invade 
Iraq, but the extent of their influence cannot be entirely divined with the information 
available. Hypothetically, behind the closed doors of Cheney’s Energy Task Force, the 
administration could have engaged in overt scheming in their meetings with 
representatives from oil companies as some speculate. Alternatively, these meetings 
could have more subtly influenced Iraq policy. Similarly, it cannot be discerned whether 
Cheney was the scheming, purely self-interested actor that many critics of the Bush 
Administration made him out to be or whether his lingering financial interest influenced 
his actions subtly or whether his connection truly had no impact on his policy choices. 
However, it is hard to imagine that Cheney’s maintained interest in Halliburton, totaling 
in millions of dollars, did not consciously or unconsciously impact his decision making. 
As expected, this research brushes up against a limit to what can be asserted about the 




the motivations and actions of the key actors behind the decision to invade Iraq. The 
Bush Administration took steps to ensure that a cloud of secrecy would occlude the 
public’s view of their decision-making even after the end of the administration. For 
example, the Bush Administration “lost” 22 million emails including many from the 
lead up to the Iraq War. Despite the limit of unknowable true intentions, private 
interests clearly played at least some role causing the invasion of Iraq.293 Private 
interests can be said to have played a significant role among multiple other factors in 
causing the Iraq War, but the exact of their role remains unclear.294  
 The conditions and mechanisms which allowed private interests to “hijack the 
state” and warp foreign policy to their own ends with the Iraq War remained more or 
less in place even after the Iraq War grew unpopular.295 Officials in crucial foreign 
policy making roles regularly jump between business and government. Various private 
interests affected by US foreign and military policy spend millions each year lobbying 
politicians. The Iraq War represents a rare convergence of different factors which led to 
the major event of war, but the mechanisms by which private interests likely influenced 
foreign policy to suit their own ends remain in place. No perfect policy solution exists 
to resolve the issue of private interests warping foreign policy to the detriment of the 
US and its people. However, concrete steps to prevent phenomena like the revolving 
                                                        
293 Nina Burleigh, “George W. Bush’s White House ‘Lost’ 22 Million Emails,” Newsweek, September 12, 
2016, sec. U.S., https://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/23/george-w-bush-white-house-lost-22-million-
emails-497373.html. 
294 It should also be noted that the different interests or reasons motivated different supporters of the war 
within the Bush Administration. Lower-level members of the Bush Administration like Paul Wolfowitz, 
Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith were clearly ideological neoconservatives who supported the war with 
strong beliefs in protecting and aiding Israel. Cheney and Rumsfeld most likely arrived at the same 
support for the war for different reasons to the neoconservatives. 




between business and government would make it more difficult for private interests to 
warp foreign policy for their own benefit. Furthermore, the connection between the 
profits of private interests and war creates a problematic situation where private 
interests are incentivized to push for military action. The general profiteering off war 
makes private interests using their influence to push foreign policy toward war 
inevitable. The privatization of war as discussed in the section neoliberal ideology 
exacerbates this problem as more and more industries rely on the US being in state of 
war for their profits. Profiting from war creates a fundamental contradiction between 
private interests and the common good as companies like the ones discussed in this 
thesis may push for wars that harm the common to maximize their own profits. 
While the exact extent of the influence of private interests in the Iraq case 
remains unclear, the evidence demonstrates that certain private interests influenced US 
policy toward the decision to invade Iraq for their own ends. In the absence of a perfect 
answer to the question of why the Bush Administration decided to invade Iraq and 
manufacture the justification needed to do so, the role of private interests cannot be 
discounted as significant evidence shows crucial actors maintaining strong connections 
to and communicating with private interests who stood to profit from or did profit from 
the invasion of Iraq. Folk theories of the causes of the Iraq War which ascribe the 
decision to invade to the undue influence of private interests often present flawed 
arguments and limited evidence, but a core of truth exists within their key claim of 
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